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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The increasing importance and appeal which the Eharatiya Jana Sangh
has achieved makes it a significant political party in India. It is intri-
guing to note that it is the only party that has shown an upward trend in
obtaining the popular vote and in capturing parliamentary and assembly seats
jn each successive general election from 1952-19^7« Moreover, since the 19&?
election, it has gained even more distinction as a potent factor in the
National Parliament and particularly in several of the Indian states by shar-
ing governing responsibilities in coalition governments. Another fact which
makes this study very pertinent is that this emerging political force is
probably the least well known or studied in the Western world of all major
parties in India. Hence it is important to look into the party - to study
its history, organization, ideology, electoral performance , its position in
the Indian political system and to speculate about the future of the party.
What trends if any, are discernible about its development? Will it become a
serious contender to replace the rule of the Congress party in India? Or are
there some elements present that will limit the growth of the party?
In the General election of 19&7, the Indian political system underwent
a dramatic transformation. The dominance of the Congress party in the system
was unexpectedly shattered and political power was dispersed between many
parties on a regional basis. Until then opposition parties in India were not
considered a serious threat to the rule of the Congress. But now, at the
state level, the power of opposition parties is no longer a threat, but a
reality. The Jana Sangh has been in the forefront of this movement and at
present is an important opposition fore© in the North Indian states of Uttar
Pradesh (U.P.), Madhya Pradesh (M.P.), Haryana, Delhi, Bihar and in the Pun-
jab, where its members are in the state cabinet. The party aims at becoming
one of the major opposition parties in the country and also aspires to become
the ruling party. The validity of these aspirations has to be verified.
While doing so, two significant considerations xaust bo kept in mind.
The first is the entrenched position of the Congress party and the factions
within it which perform the function of opposition parties. The second is the
flexibility with which the Jana Sangh is capable of operating and performing.
The Congress party, accomodating under its wings other parties which
are now in opposition to it, spearheaded the national movement under which
India gained its independence in 1$&7 • Hence the Congress party was able to
cultivate strongholds of power that have carried over, and serve as bases of
operation in the post-independence decades. Therefore it will take the oppo-
sition parties more time to establish themselves as strongly as the Congress.
The Jana Sangh came into existence only in 1951 * four years after India
gained her independence. Thus, it has had a late start, even though the
Hindu Mahasabha did operate under the Congress and the Mahasabha has been
called the political ancestor of the Jana Sangh. The Congress also reaped
the advantage of having in its ranks many nationally known leaders who had
participated in the independence movement and they were able in later years
to draw more votes to the party. Besides, the umbrella-like movement has
brought another advantage to the Congress party, though often this character-
istic has also been detrimental in its effects to the party. The Congress
harbored many shades of opinion within it in pre-independence days and was
able to maintain them, since the primary aim of all participants was to
achieve independence. After independence was achieved, some of the partici-
pants, such as the Socialists, forced their own party but other ciembers
retained their Congress membership which has led to the cultivation of sev-
eral factions within the Congress party itself. These factions then have
performed the function of opposition parties within the Congress -' criticis-
ing and balancing issues. However, this base of strength which the Congress
had cultivated is undoubtedly facing erosion as the results of the four gen-
eral elections held in the country show. The question of flexibility or
pragmatism with which the Jana Sangh performs and operates and on which
depends th9 future of the party, is the main concern of this paper. It could
be said that the Jana Sangh had its origins in a defense mechanism which had
essentially religious moorings, but has since its inception been politicised.
To demonstrate this it will be necessary to look first at the historical ori-
gins of the Jana Sangh, then to consider party ideology as revealed in mani-
festoes and public statements and finally to judge the party's performance in
electoral competition. And while doing so there are some important conflicts
that must be observed.
Underlying all of them is the Aryan non-Aryan, or North-South differ-
entration. The Jana Sangh is often classified as a party of North Indian
Brahman interests. This becomes apparent in the party's adherence to Hindi
as the national language of India, and the rejection of English. The lan-
guage issue has become anathema in the South, particularly in Tamilnadu,
where the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DKK) party is in favor of retaining
English and the regional language.
The Jana Sangh is also classified as a party of communal interests;
and many people argue that communal ties are a threat to secular democracy in
India and point to the increasing electoral success of "communal" parties
like the Jana Sangh as evidence of the impending doom of Indian democracy.
The problem seems aggravated by the declining fortunes of the Congress Party
especially at the State level and the possibility that the Jana Sangh may be
one of the successors to Congress rule.
The accusation that the Jana Sangh is a communal party is often
refuted by Jana Sanghis who point to the fact that the membership of the
party is open, and it has sponsored other than Hindu candidates in the elec-
tions. Yet, the party is almost exclusively Hindu in membership, control and
support; and many of its beliefs in a traditional Indian society are of dubi-
ous value to non-Hindus. To be fair, though, it should be noted that there
are degrees of communalism. The Jana Sangh is not so rigidly Hindu as the
other two major Hindu parties, the Hindu Mahasabha or the Ram Rajya Parishad,
nor does it stand solely for the interests of its community as does the Sikh
Akali Dal or the Muslim League. To project an all-India image and increase
its electoral support, it will bo imperative for the Jana Sangh to diversify
its appeal. It is beginning to do so - whether it will continue to do so
will be a measure of its success.
The fact that it does support the flowering of a traditional Hindu
society brings the conflict of the traditional versus modern into the Jana
Sangh itself. The party has put it thus:
...the rebuilding of Bharat on the basis of Bharatiya Sanskrit! and
maryada as a political social and economic democracy granting equal
opportunity to and liberty to all individuals so as to make her a
prosperous, powerful and united nation, progi'essive modern and
enlightened.
^
Tet, it seems inevitable that the very modernization demanded by the
Jana Sangh will go far to destroy, or at least undermine the fabric of the
traditional society. The Jana Sangh would like to import Western technology
and use Western capital, while barring the entry of Western secularism and
liberalism. It seems possible that the only way forward will be a moderation
of such espoused aims.
A similar moderation has to be considered in the context of the expan-
sion of the influence of the party in the country. In a democratic society,
a party must win povrer through electoral success. The party has not been
strong enough to obtain povrer and become the major government-forming party
in any state by itself alone. But it has been able to do so in coalition
with other parties. Such agreements have often been reached with parties
with whom the Jana Sangh differs in policy. This means that a certain degree
of moderation is prerequisite to expansion. How much will the Jana Sangh be
willing to modify its policy, then, becomes a crucial question, which may in
turn be dependent upon the leadership at the helm of party affairs. If it
remains very strictly controlled by Hindu communal elements, moderation will-
be impeded. Thus, a great measure of the success of the Jana Sangh will
depend upon the flexibility that the party has and will be able to display.
This aspect can be observed in policy statements, and particularly in elec-
tion behavior, in the alliances that the Jana Sangh makes and the modifica-
tion of policy that it adopts. If inflexible, the Jana Sangh will contribute
to the already confused divisiveness of the Indian political culture. Where
its attempts at polarization of public opinion will not achieve a significant
level, fragmentation will result. To assure itself of a significant role in
Indian politics, the Jana Sangh must recognize that moderation and accomoda-
tion will be necessary for existence.
The Jana_ Sangh in_the
mi
Indian. Political jSystem
Parties, where they exist in a political system, are a connecting link
between the government and people. Often they are studied to gain greater
insight into the workings of the system. Parties become important vehicles
because the people realise that through them they can influence the use of
power. Political parties provide the machinery through which people can par-
ticipate in the system; in the management of conti'oversy they can help to
aggregate and articulate interests; by their activities they can promote
integration and by their own organization they can contribate to developing
structural differentiation. Developing nations, like India, face several
crises while they are in the process of developing. Parties can be instru-
mental in helping to resolve some of these crises of legitimacy, participa-
tion and integration. 3 At the same time parties can also accentuate crises
by exploiting certain issues to obtain mass support. E.g., in India the
national language controversy, reorganization of states were inflamed by
political parties, thus adding greater stress on the system.
The Jana Sangh party in India acts as the organ that performs the
interest aggregation function for that section of the society that believes
in Hindu nationalism while the RSS, the organizational precursor of the Jana
Sangh, performs the interest articulation function for this same section of
society and also for the Jana Sangh. Both these organizations also help to
socialise people into the system by providing them with the party channels to
do so and by encouraging them to vote. The Jana Sangh uses the press, public
meetings and national conventions to communicate with the electorate. While
the Jana Sangh by acting as spokesman for the Hindu majority helps to consol-
idate- them into one group, it at the same time puts other communities and
some castes on the defensive to protect their own rights because they per-
ceive the threat of majority domination. Under these circumstances tensions
between communities caii develop and can also easily assume larger proportions,
endangering the peace and stability of the country. Yet by participating in
the election process, the Jana Sangh endorses the system and recognizes and
helps to establish its legitimacy.
The existence of parties in opposition to the one(s) in power is a
sign of the freedom to express one's views. Opposition parties perform three
important functions in the system: They represent interests that may have
been overlooked by the majority party; they also provide a channel for con-
veying information—to the government they bring the impact of and reactions
to its policies, while to the people, they interpret these policies. A third
responsibility of the Opposition is "providing criticism and posing useful
alternatives to government policies."-'
The opposition party (or parties) is an ever present reminder to the
party in power that the authority to make decisions in the national interest
can be challenged and can change hands. Opposition parties often make this
known by the tactics they employ. In India this occurs and can be explained
in terms of the pre-independence experience. The efforts of political par-
ties were directed against the foreign power, Britain, and this negative
feeling has now carried over to parties that are ranged in opposition to the
ruling Congress party. Maurice Duverger's classification of internal and
external parties can be well adapted to the Jana Sangh. In Duverger's opin-
ion internally created parties, are those that have their origin within their
respective legislatures, and thus adhere to and respect parliamentary proce-
dure. In India, unlike Western parties all parties had their origin outside
8tho legislature, in a national movement for freedom against colonial rule.
In this sense they are not internally created parties. While most Indian
parties operated under the Indian National Congress, the Jana Sangh did not.
It can thus be called an external party - a party external in comparison to
many other parties. At present, there are other parties, e.g., Swatantra and
DMK, that have originated outside the Congress, The Jana Sangh has features
that closely resemble the external party described by Duverger. It is more
centralized than other parties. The drive for its origin came from the RSS
leadership and Syama Prasad Hookerjee, its founder, not from local communi-
ties - though local organisations were ostensibly created before the national
organization was proclaimed. It has greater discipline within its ranks and
& marked absence of factionalism so prevalent in other Indian parties, espe-
cially the Congress. Besides the electoral significance of the party, great
stress is laid on the cultural sphere towards promoting a way of life. The
importance that the Jana Sangh ascribes to electoral gain distinguishes it
from Duverger's external party. This aspect, increased electoral support for
the party which has resulted in some flexibility on party activities, has
brought the Jana Sangh into conflict with the RSS. This flexibility can be
seen as a political maturing of the Jana Sangh and is of considerable impor-
tance to the development of the Indian political system. What are the
effects of such a development in the party? How does it affect its relation-
ship with the RSS, and with the party in power? Does it affect the config-
uration of the party system?
The party system is characterized by the kind of parties that comprise
it. The Indian system till 19&7 was in Roy Macridis* classification' both
integrative and competitive; integrative in support^ and in function and mode
of action ;° competitive also in support and particularly in organization
where there is a diffusion of political parties. A more graphic description
is that used by Almond. It is a dominant non-authoritarian system, domi-
nated by the Congress party. The other political parties that existed and
functioned were overshadowed by this towering organization. The distance
between them and decision making power was great and often led to the unreal-
istic positions taken by the parties in opposition. However, the opposition
parties have gradually consolidated their positions. The populace has been
mobilised to a greater extent and this has resulted in increased participa-
tion in the political system. In the 19&7 elections the Congress party did
not obtain its usual majority in the states, and political pox-rer has been
distributed among various other parties. The Congress has maintained a
majority in the Center, yet the configuration of the system has undergone a
change from a dominant non-authoritarian to a multi-party system, at least at
the state level. It is too early to say whether, as it is now, the config-
uration will remain or revert to the former dominant non-authoritarian type
if the Congress should regain power, or evolve into a multiple party competi-
tive system. The situation at present is fluid. Rapid social and economic
change will also influence the development of the system. The role of the
Jana Sangh will be interesting to observe. Whether it will become more
ideological in defense, or evolves into a pragmatic traditional party,
remains to be seon.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE JAM SANGH
The roots of the Jana Sangh lie immediately in the Rashtriya Swayamse-
vak Sangh, which together with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad
had its beginnings in the traditions of late nineteenth century Hindu nation-
alism.
The response of the nineteenth century Indian middle class to British
rule can be termed either reformist or revivalist.
In their emphasis to reform of the traditional social order, both
(the reformists and revivalists) agreed in principle. Both were
influenced by English education, rule of law, Christian missions and
their methods of work and organization. But, while the reformists
responded favorably to Western influence, the revivalists regarded
them as a serious affront to India's cultural heritage and intelle c-
tual pride. x±
The factors that led to this revivalist response were both economical
and psychological. Among the economic factors was the frustration with
British rule especially in the sphere of the employment of the educated.
There vera insufficient jobs for the numbers of those who were now obtaining
a Western education. Also, examinations for the Indian Civil Service, were
held in England, and thus posed a difficulty for those who could not afford
to make the trip overseas. This kind of a journey created social problems of
many kinds. One faced ostracism from caste after a journey abroad, because
living in the West was often associated with breaking dietary restrictions
and with immoral behavior. Often those educated abroad displayed a disparag-
ing attitude towards anything indigenous, "Revivalism was also a reaction to
what was considered a psychological surrender. "-^
Hinduism was indeed faced with a crisis of culture. It arose from
the British policy to build on the foundation of a traditionally
ID-
caste ridden agricultural society, an educational, legal and poli-
tical system which had in the West resulted basically from the
Industrial Revolution and a flexible social system. ..The acceptance
of the Western concept of social mobility constituted a real chal-
lenge to Brahmanisra and the exclusive concept of its class order. 3
To the revivalists, political freedom was essential for religious and cul-
tural freedom.
Anti-Hindu influence in the form of Westernization and Western ideas,
and Islam, were the alien influences that Swami Dayanand Saraswati (182^-
1883) founder of the Arya Sama.j tried to counteract, in an effort not only to
conserve Hindu society, but also to reform and revitalize Hindu society. Eo
sought to arouse the Hindu community into active resistance to the alien
influences which threatened it and confidently proclaimed the superiority of
the Hindu religion over Christianity. His watchword was "back to the Vedas."
In this slogan was the implication of the exclusion of extra-Hindu influences
such as Islam, Christianity and the British government.
Bal Gangadhar Tilak (I856-I92O) also came in the tradition of the
Revivalists. Tilak blended religion with politics and was able to carry his
message to the masses. It was Tilak who thundered "Swarajya is my birthright
and I shall have it." Tilak with strong support from Lala Rajpat Rai from the
Punjab, and B. C. Pal from Bengal formed the axis of the Extremist group in
the Indian National Congress and was opposed to Constitution agitation (of
the Moderate wing) as the channel for demanding independence. This new
approach gave added zeal to the National movement, but at the same time fur-
ther alienated many Muslims from the Swarajya Movement. Tilak used Hindu
festivals such as Ganapati puja, ^ and celebrations in honor of Shiva ji, ^
heroic Maratha King, to provide the symbols of a nascent nationalism. At the
same time Tilak did encourage Western education, but he put the emphasis on
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Vedic religiorii He wanted the younger generation educated in Western science
and literature to derive their cultural values froia the traditional Indian
view and way of life. Tilak decried any English interference in Hindu tradi-
tional customs. For example, he opposed child marriage reform* As such in
the beginning of the twentieth century, a mixture of the Hindu religion and a
patriotic spirit exists which makes it difficult to draw a clear dividing
line between Indian nationalism and Hindu communalism.
Nationalism inevitably drew part of its inspiration from India's
ancient cultural traditions, and these were mainly Hindu. India was
the only home of the Hindus, and whatever patriotic demands were
made in the name of the majority would naturally appear to be
expressions of Indian Nationalism. "
In contrast to Hindu extremists the Moderates who had believed in
institutional reform never developed a mass following because "any movement
on a mass scale had to appeal to the people in a language intelligible to
them, the language of religion.' ' In 1906, Tilak helped Vinayak Savarkar to
go to England for his studies in law. During his stay in England, he became
famous as a terrorist against the British regime and was sentenced to life
imprisonment in the Andaman Islands of India - where he found his elder
brother Ganesh, a renowned terrorist, also imprisoned. During his imprison-
ment Vinayak scratched on prison walls his treatise on Hindutva (Hindu-
ness). This treatise was published in 192*4-, four years after Tilak' s death.
Thus in the tradition of Hindu nationalism Vinayak Savarkar followed Tilak.
Hindutva and the thoughts of Vinayak on the superiority of the Hindu nation
to all other politics gave a theoretical foundation to the Hindu communal
party, the Hindu Hahasabha.
This drive for the unity of the Hindu community became most intensely
anti-Muslim, as more and more Muslims followed Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's advice
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to boycott the Indian National Congress and nationalist parties. It was
during the years (1905-190?) that the Extremists dominated the Congress move-
ment that the Muslim League was founded in 1906. It was the first communal
organization that made its appeal on an all-India basis. °
Meanwhile the communally minded Hindus within the Congress, were grad-
ually alienated by the Congress leadership's "appeasement policy" toward the
Muslims. By the Lucknow Pact (I9I6) Congress accepted the Muslim League's
principle of separate electorates for the two communities. Under Mahatma
Gandhi's leadership, the Congress participated in the Muslim Khilafat move-
ment (1920) which agitated for the restoration of the Sultan of Turkey, the
Caliph of Islam, to his pre-war status. At this time it was felt that
Gandhiji was completely ignoring the demands of the Hindus in his attempt to
reconcile the Muslims, and his compromises only led to greater demands on the
part of the Muslims. 20 /
But, as with Lokmanya Tilak, so with Gandhiji, their followers were
not able to distinguish between the broader aim of independence and the means
applied to obtain them.
Gandhiji tried to convert his leadership in the Congress into an
instrument intended not only to fight for political freedom, but
also to reconcile through a religious approach, the conflicting
interests of labor and capital, landlord and tenant, Hindu and Mus-
lim, Brahman and Harijan. But the mass of the people could not
distinguish between religion, race and communalism. A resort to
religion as the basis of political appeal, produced violence and
communal riots. 21
Though the origins of the Hindu Mahasabha can be traced to the Punjab
Hindu Conference in Lahore in 1907 » its first important session was held in
1923.22 At that time its work was devoted mainly to a cultural sphere and
members of the Mahasabha continued to bo members of the Congress. At this
session which was held in Benaras, the Mahasabha endorsed Shuddhi , the
HA
reconversion of Hindus who had left the fold. There v;ere two immediate reac-
tions to this move: communal riots, and counter propaganda by the Muslims.
By 1933 » the Hahasabha came out in open opposition to the Congress and
decided to put up its own candidates in the elections.
In the pre-independence period, the Mahasabha did not stand for the
creation of a Hindu state, and claims that the vacillation of the Congress
leaders in appeasing the Muslims brought this aspect into focus. In the
post-independence decades, the Mahasabha ideology embodies a stand for Akhand
Bharat (undivided India); Hindu Raj; strictly reciprocal relations with Paki-
stan, complete integration of Kashmir with India. The Mahasabha makes a
distinction between Hindu and non-Hindu citizens of Akhand Bharat. It claims
that Hindus alone are the nationals of India, and non-Hindus can be classi-
fied only as Indian citizens. The non-Hindus shall be entitled to equal
TABLE I
ELECTION RESULTS OF JAMA SANGH AND HINDU MAHASABHA 1951-1967
1951 195? 1962 1967
Li_S.* L.A.** L.S. L.A. L.S. L.A. L.S . L.A.
Hindu Mahasabha 4-24 28 16 - -
Bhartiya Jana Sangh 3 3^ k k6 14 115 35 26k
* Lok Sabha
** Legislative Assembly
rights and privileges under normal conditions; in the event of war or other
emergencies, however, the government, would have powers to distinguish
between Hindu and non-Hindu citizens. 23 It was V. D. Savarkar, President of
the Hindu Mahasabha from 1937-19^-2, who first formulated systematically the
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concept of the Hindu state in the earlier mentioned treatise, Hindutva
.
Though some of the ideological principles of the Mahasabha have been incor-
porated into the Jana Sangh ideology, the Mahasabha as a political party has
steadily lost ground since independence. This trend can be seen by examining
the genoral election fortunes of the Mahasabha and Jana Sangh in Table I.
In the wake of the communal riots that swept the city of Nagpur in
1925 i the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was founded by Dr. Keshav Hedge-
war.^'
- The RSS literally means National Self-Service organization, and
derives its ideology from Savarkar's ideas which also served to revitalise
the Mahasabha. This Hindu nationalist organisation, RSS, however, consists
of a highly disciplined cadre of workers and a strict hierarchical structural
organisation. At the apex of the structure is the Sar Sanghchalak, who
exercises autocratic control of the organisation. Dr. Hedgewar was succeeded
by "Guruji" Golwalkar in 19^0 and he is still in office. The RSS promotes
obedience and uniformity of opinion within its ranks. Each member belongs to
a cell of fifty individuals and he must attend daily exercise sessions. A
kind of military discipline is maintained and the Swayamsevaks (Volunteers)
are even taught lathi drill. Uniformity of ideology is maintained in the
organisation through weekly discussions, identical libraries and itinerent
officials
,
RSS ideology is best expressed in Golwalkar' s book We, or Our Nation-
hood pefined
.
25 Golwalkar defines nation as a cultural unit, not a political
one. He claims that in India the best solution to the minorities problem is
their assimilation with the Hindu nation. Hinduism is exalted and religion
plays a vital role in public and political life. Thus by defining the nation
in this way, Golwalkar is trying to justify the existence of the RSS.
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Other scholars, however, tend to classify the RSS as an organization-
that has features that are
Highly reminiscent of fascist movements in Europe ... the leader
principle, the stress on militarism, the doctrine of racial cul-
tural superiority, ultranationalism infused with religious idealism,
the use of symbols of past greatness, the emphasis on national soli-
darity, the exclusion of religious or ethnic minorities from the
nation concept - all of these features of RSS are highly reminis-
cent of fascist movements in Europe. The major difference is that
the concept of state-worship, the state as all absorbing reality in
which the individual loses himself to find meaning is totally
absent, 26
In fact the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has always claimed that it is a
sociocultural organization mainly interested in the regeneration of Hindu
society. It has never openly contested elections,
VJith the partition of the country in 19^7 » feelings ran high in the
Mahasabha and the RSS, They had been opposed to Gandhiji's compromises with
the Muslims. On January 30 t 19^8 t Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by
Nathuram V, Godse, a Kaharashtrian Brahman who had been affiliated with the
RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha and was still known as a devoted lieutenant of
V, D, Savarkar. General public opinion held the two organizations responsi-
ble though the judicial hearings found no evidence of direct participation of
the RSS and the Mahasabha in the assassination. ^7
The Mahasabha under the leadership of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee decided
to suspend political activity. On February ^, 19^8, the RSS was banned by
the Government of India. ^° After the ban was imposed on the RSS, it was felt
that if RSS had political representation in Parliament, it would not have
been possible for the government to ban it.^9 The need was felt to enter the
political arena but the RSS did not consider the Mahasabha an adequate forum
for representation, and so looked for a new pD.atfomi.
At this time, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 30 a brilliant member of
17
Parliament, was also looking for an organization, having had a distinguished
career in the academic and political fields. Dr. Shyama Prasad was the son
of a noted Bengali educationist, Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, Sir Ashutosh as
Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University had chartered the educational program
of Calcutta University. Shyama Prasad, was called to the bar in England in
1927, and in 1929 » he started his political career. Ke was elected to the
Bengal Legislative Council in 1929 1 as a member of Congress. In 193^ » he was
elected to Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, the same position that his
father had held, at the age of thirty-three . He served in a number of aca-
demic positions during this period. But he became increasingly disenchanted
with the Congress and opposed the Muslim League, and under the advice of
Hedgewar and Savarkar, joined the Hindu Mahasabha in 1939 • He was impressed
by RSS organization. Mookerjee continued to be active in the struggle of
independence, and with the advent of independence on August 15 1 19^7 » Pandit
Jawahar Lai Nehru included him in his cabinet as Minister of Industries and
Supplies. However, after the assassination of Kahatma Gandhi, when the
Mahasabha became a suspect organization, there were no aspersions cast on
Mookerjee' s character and he retained his cabinet rank. But in 19^3, he dif-
fered with Mahasabha leaders over the question of open membership in the
party. Mookerjee suggested that the party drop its communal membership
requirement and open its rolls to members of all communities, not only to
Hindus. But his proposal was defeated by the Working Committee and Mookerjee
resigned in December 19^8.31 From then until 1951 » when the Jana Sangh was
founded, he did not belong to any party. In the Cabinet his views differed
from those of Mr. Nehru on Kashmir and Bengal. Matters came to a head on the
East Bengal issue, and in 1950, Mookerjee resigned from the Cabinet in protest
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of the Liaquat-Nehru Pact-^ which affected the status of Hindus in East
Bengal. The Pact contained a pledge to maintain equal rights for minorities
in each country. It also provided for the return of refugees without hin-
drance to place of origin and gave them the right to carry all movable prop-
erty and to dispose of all immovable property and carry the proceeds with
them. Thus each government would have no extra territorial claim on the
minorities of the other country. Mookerjee could not accept this "desertion"
by India of the Hindus of East Bengal. The Pact violated his "pledge" to the
Hindus of East Bengal, and so he resigned from the Cabinet. He now began
"the quest for a platform" which ended with the formation of the Jana
Sangh, 33 From Hookerjee's view point, the Mahasabha's name was still tar-
nished from Gandhi's murder, and it would be difficult for him to gain India-
wide backing were he again to join this organization.
Some RSS leaders (including two later Presidents, the late Deen Dayal
Upadhyaya
,
-^ and Balraj Madhok-^-5 ) had already made contacts with Mookerjee
and in fact he had been assured of RSS support should he start a new party.-'
He realized the need for an all-India party, and kept contact with the Delhi
group of the RSS who had approached him and also with his friend N. C. Chat-
terjee who had joined the Mahasabha at the same time as Mookerjee.
A long time observer of the Indian political scene once described
the founding of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh as the coming together of a
political leader in need of an organization, an organization in need
of a leader for the political aspects of its program. The leader
was Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee; the organization, the Rashtriya
Swayam Sevak Sangh. 3/
Balraj Madhok makes it clear that RSS members at least as individuals
were closely tied to the political organizing which led to the formation of
the Jana Sangh. About the organization as a whole participating in such
adventure he wrote:
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It (P3S) however permitted its workers to cooperate and collab-
orate with Dr. Hookerjee for the formation of a party which might
reflect their viewpoint on national questions. -^
On May 5i 1951 » in Calcutta, Mookerjee announced the formation of the
People's Party which was the precursor of Jana Sangh. -^9 ^s the time went on
similar units of the People's Party were formed in Delhi, Bombay, Uttar-
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Karnatak, Vindhya Pradesh, Gujerat and Bihar.^ Finally,
the delegates of these branches met in Delhi on October 21, 1951 to establish
the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. 1 Mookerjee was elected President and in his
acceptanc3 speech emphasized the role of a responsible opposition party.
...one of the chief reasons for the manifestation of dictatorship
in Congress rule is the absence of well organized opposition parties
. .
oBhartiya Jana Sangh emerges today as an All India political party
which will function as the principal party in opposition. . .(opposi-
tion) does not mean senseless or destructive approach to all prob-
lems that confront responsible government. While, therefore, we may
have to attack or criticise official measures or acts , our aim will
be to approach all problems in constructive spirit so that we may
keep the public vigilant and make humble contribution in developing
a real democratic structure for the sound administration of the
country. ^
In the same speech Mookerjee declared that the party would be open for
all Indians, a stand which was more liberal than the RSS or Mahasabha.
We have thrown our party to all citizens of India irrespective of
caste, creed or community. . .the people must be united by a bond of
fellowship and understanding inspired by deep devotion to the spirit
of a common motherland. . .it is obviously for the vast majority of
Bharat's population to assure all classes of people who are truly
loyal to their motherland, that they will be entitled to full pro-
tection under the law and to complete equality of treatments in all
matters, social, economical and political. Our party gives assur-
ance unreservedly. 3
Thus the Bharatiya Jana Sangh came into existence. Its organization
base lay mainly in the RSS; from the Mahasabha it inherited the mantle of
participating in political activity. The Mahasabha had fallen from grace due
to suspected affiliation in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, and has
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never recovered.
The success of the Jana Sangh was based on the strength of the organi-
zational structure of the RSS, but also is a result of the party's willing-
ness to be somewhat flexible in order to obtain a greater following. This
will become evident by observing the policy statements and election results
in the following chapters. As will ba further observed, the Jana Sangh has
become a recognized force in the Indian political system, especially in
Northern India.
CHAPTER III
PARTY ORGANIZATION^
While competition for public office gains a party more attention, it
is the party organization which provides continuity, form, and to some extent
direction to the party. Moreover, the types of conflict which occur with all
political parties are often more evident within the party organisation or
between the organization and the elected members. In India, this has been
particularly true of the Congress party, but organizational considerations
are also pertinent to the study of opposition parties such as the Jana Sangh.
The organization of the Jana Sangh assumes importance in view of the
fact that attempts at recruiting a greater number of people into the party's
ranks tend to make the party more open to the accomodation of different view
points. This has especially come into focus with attempts on behalf of the
party to assume a more national character by expansion in Southern India.
Whenever the question of expansion in the South comes up, it is always faced
with the party's rigid stand on making Hindi the national language. The
south opposes this stand, and instead prefers retention of English along with
the southern regional languages. When crises of this nature arise which have
as their focal point language, or religion, the party is faced with a deci-
sion to be either flexible or rigid in its response. Greater participation
and consequent electoral success have led to growing accomodation within the
party, and in the case of the Jana Sangh, to a lessening of the communal
facade. For increased participation the party needs to communicate with the
electorate, socialise it, and provide it with a stable organization and lead-
ership to articulate its demands.
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The communication and socialization functions are performed by the
formal organisational wings of the party, and by volunteer organizations or
associations that are affiliated or closely allied to the party. It will be
seen in the course of this discussion that the question of succession has
also boen institutionalized as has been seen in the face of two emergencies,
when the President of the Party died or resigned. It will also be important
to consider the aspects of factionalism in the party, and member recruitment.
The diffusion of organization enables the party to reach the masses.
In India this is important, because about 85$ of the population lives in the
rural areas. Interest articulation among the masses can take place at the
most rudimentary level. Important party meetings like conventions or
National congresses play an important part in arousing enthusiasm for the
party. In India meetings of national calibre are often planned on a lavish
scale, and hence tend to excite curiosity on the part of the public to come
and see what the big "taroaashaa 5 j_s about. In doing so, the party is in a
subtle way initiating people into its ranks. On the other hand, the formal
organization of the party enables it to function smoothly, so that the Cen-
tral party organization is not overburdened with work, and also cannot assume
too rigid a control over the subsidiary organizations. It also helps to
create leadership at the local level. The formal organization of the Jana
Sangh exists at six levels: the precinct, block, Zila (district), Pradesh
(state or provincial), Zonal and Bharatiya (national).
The basic unit of the Jana Sangh is the Sthaniya Samiti , the terri-
torial extent of which corresponds to that of a polling booth (precinct) at
the General Election, The members of each Sthaniya Samiti elect their Work-
ing Committee called the Karya Samiti which consists of a President,
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Secretary, Treasurer, and four other members if the total membership in the
precinct is loss than 3^0, and eight members if the total membership in the
precinct is 300 or more. The Sthaniya Samiti plays an important part in the
organisation of the party in carrying its message to the masses. It is the
connecting link between the party and the actual voter, and convoys the
ideals and programs of the Jana Sangh. It enrolls new members, executes the
policies and directions issued by the Fradeshik Karya Samiti (Provincial
Working Committee).
The Karya Samitis of the various Sthaniya Samitis within the jurisdic-
tion of a Mandal (area equivalent to a block with approximately 60,000 inhab-
itants) elect the office bearers to the Handal Samiti . The officers of the
Mandal Samiti are a President, two Vice Presidents, a Secretary, not more
than two Joint Secretaries and a Treasurer. If the membership in the pre-
cinct is less than 25 » the officers of its Sthaniya Samiti are not eligible
to vote in the Mandal Samiti elections. Eesides its elected members, the
Mandal Samiti also has members (six to twelve) who have been appointed by the
President of the Mandal Samiti. The Mandal Samiti supervises the work of the
Sthaniya Samitis, forms new Sthaniya Samitis, and reorganizes the old Samitis
with the approval of the Pradesh Karya Samiti, and prepares the list of
voters. The Mandal Samitis are also authorized to deal with local problems
and express their opinions regarding national problems by passing resolutions
which are forwarded even to the Central Executive of the Party. They elect a
representative to the Fradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha , which is the supreme body
of the State.
The Mandal Samitis within a district (Zila) elect the Zila Samiti.
Some members of the Zila Samiti are nominated by the elected President of the
Zh
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Fig. 1. Structural Organisation of the Party.
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same* The President and Secretary of each Zila Samiti are members of the
Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (National Delegates Conference). As such they
play an important role in the election of the. All India President of the
Jana Sangh.
Delegates and representatives from different parts of the state con-
stitute the Pradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha (State Delegates Conference). The
Working Committee at the state level, the Pradeshik Karya Samiti is elected
from these delegates, or nominated by its president. The Pradeshik Karya
Samiti is independently organized from the Central bodies, and therefore has
full scope to form policy at the State level and to supervise the former
bodies of the State. The election of its members is not ratified by the
Central Committee.
The Central Executive has no power of superceding the State Execu-
tive, but it has powers of issuing directions and controlling the
working of the State Executive.^
The State Executive has in turn a hand in the policy making at the Central
level by the fact that the State Secretary attends the meetings of the Cen-
tral Working Committee. It can also offer suggestions and send resolutions
to the Central Executive. Moreover, on vital provincial matters, the Center
takes into consideration the views of the State Executive.
It would appear that the State Executive has scope for initiating
policy not in accordance with the wishes of the Central Executive
provided it does not affect the basic principles of the Party. '
The next level in the structural organization is at the National level.
The Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (National Delegates Conference) is constituted
of the tvio office bearers of all district committees viz, the President and
Secretary of the district Committees. The body elects the All India Presi-
dent of the Jana Sangh, The President of the party nominates the other office
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bearers and members of the Bharatiya Kjrya Sjamiti (Central Executive). The
Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha is the supreme body and chief organ for laying
down the policy and program of the Jana Sangh. It enjoys the pov:er to deal
with all matters and situations that may arise, including the power of issu-
ing any directions to the various bodies. It meets at least once a year, and
the meeting is convened whenever required by the Karya Samiti, or on a joint
requisition by not less than 50 members specifying the purpose for which it
is required. It can affiliate to the Jana Sangh any organization or associa-
tion and give it such representation it may deem fit. The quorum for
Pratinidhi Sabha meetings is l/lO of the membership. The Bharatiya Prat-
inidhi Sabha frames the rules and issues directions for the proper working of
the Jana Sangh constitution. It superintends, directs, and controls all
Pradeshik Karya Samitis and takes such disciplinary action as it may deem fit
against any individual Samiti or Sabha, other than the Bharatiya Karya Sabha,
It takes all steps necessary for implementing the objectives of the party, it
controls the funds, makes rules for their proper disbursement to the various
bodies and arranges for their audit.
The Bharatiya Karya Samiti (Central Executive) consists of the Presi-
dent of the party, and not more than 31 members nominated by the President
from among the Pratinidhi Sabha. Of these the General Secretary assumes
great importance. According to the Constitution of the Jana Sangh, the
President could prove to have overriding powers, and therefore become
extremely powerful. In practice, the President of the Jana Sangh has "so far
been a nominal head (rather) than an effective force, the real influence
being exercised by the General Secretary. "^ Whereas the Jana Sangh has had
a nuriber of Presidents, the General Secretary tends to stay in office for a
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relatively long time. Thus the General Secretary is able to consolidate his
power. The Central Executive carries into effect the policy and programs
laid down by the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha and is responsible to it. In
practice, the Bharatiya Karya Samiti formulates all policy decisions and
resolutions and presents them for discussion and approval to the Bharatiya
Pratinidhi Sabha.
This basic structure of the party underwent a change in 1958. To
improve communications from the Center and the states, the office of Zonal
Secretary was created. The zonal set-up allotted the entire country to four
zones. The zones had as their core states those in which the Jana Sangh was
reasonably well established, the new ones being attached to the established
areas. Therefore, though not geographically logical, the division is sound
organizationally.
The northern zone includes Punjab, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu
and Kashmir. Of the eastern zone, the core state is Uttar Pradesh, and the
other states are Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Manipur and Tripura. The western
zone extends from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal and includes Rajasthan,
and Madhya Pradesh as core states, with Gujarat and Orissa.
Attempts to extend the Jana Sangh to the south led to the formation of
the southern zone which includes Maharashtra, Mysore, Goa and Pondicherry.
To assist in the advancement of the Jana Sangh in the south, the Jana Sangh
has consciously held its sessions or sessions of the Bharatiya Pratinidhi
Sabha in those sections of the country. In 1959 i the general session was
held in Bangalore. A meeting of the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha was held in
Hyderabad in i960. In his Presidential address, Ghosh said that the reason
for the meeting was two-fold. First, "they should know more intimately the
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message of the Jana Sangh." Secondly:
...the South as such had many local problems of her own
—
problems
peculiar to its position and its people.., I thought accordingly
that, in order that the Jana Sangh might develop a broad all-India
outlook ar.d might really claim to represent India as a whole, it
must extend its activities to the South and feel its (of the
South) pulse and heart-beats... '
Thus through the formal organization of the Party, the Jana Sangh hopes to
carry its message to all parts of India in an attempt to achieve the image of
a national party. Yet at present, its strength remains concentrated in the
Hindi heartland of Northern India. Its success in the South requires not
only formal organizational status, but also ideological moderation.
Every member of the Jana Sangh on enrollment, has to contribute to the
membership fund. However, he cannot seek election to any office of body of
the party except the local committee (Sthaniya Samiti) unless he has been
active for one year after enrollment. An active member is expected to attend
50;o of the meetings of the unit he belongs to and devote some time daily to
party work or function as a member of Parliament, Legislative Assembly cr
local body, or participate in any other social service organized by the
party. Any member who absents himself from the unit concerned continuously
for three meetings without permission, or fails to pay the fees fixed by the
Constitution within three months from the date of his enrollment as a member,
is considered an inactive member. However, the All India Working Committee
may make an exception to the above rules and the Provincial President has the
right to free any member from the liability created from his being inactive.
In cases where the Constitution of the Jana Sangh has to be amended, a
quorum of 2/3 of the majority of members present and voting is required of
the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha. Any dispute arising under the Jana Sangh
constitution is referred to the next higher body or a body especially
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constituted for the purpose. Any person aggrieved by tho decision of such a
body appeals to the President.
The Jana Sangh raises funds by way of donations, membership fees,
purse collections, monthly donations by party members, sale of party litera-
ture and monthly contributions by party legislators. Within the State, col-
lections made by the district and lower bodies are distributed among the
different organs at all levels in the manner and proportion fixed by the
State Executive. 50
Auxiliary Organizations
Organizations or associations that are affiliated or closely allied to
the party play an important role of "socializing" the masses into the main-
stream of the thought of the party. Among those that do sympathize with the
Jana Sangh are:
a. The Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh
b. Akh.il Bharatiya Vidhyarti Parishsd (All India Students' Organization)
c. Bharatiya Kazdoor Sangh (Indian Labour Organization)
d. Mahila Agadhe (Women's Organization)
e. Publications
—
The Organizer
, Pratap , Pancha.jayna.
The RSS has not only been the "organizational ancestor" of the Jana
Sangh, but helps the Jana Sangh in time of election campaigning. Along with
many other elections, RSS workers campaigned extensively and effectively for
the Jana Sangh when it captured the Delhi Corporation seats in I967. It is
said that Jana Sangh policy makers do not act without consulting Nagpur.
(RSS Headquarters.) Moreover the other auxiliary organizations are also RSS
oriented.
The Vidyarthi Parishad was founded in l9;+8, and is run mainly by
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volunteers who are sympathetic to the cause of the RSS. For elections,
demonstration marches and similar endeavours, the Jana Sangh will call upon
the members of the Parishad. It has been observed that delegates to the Jana
Sangh Conferences are usually young people.
The Jana Sangh tries to van the minds and allegiance of young men
while they are in college. The party can offer them political work and polit-
ical advancement soon after they leave their studies.
On the labour front, the Jana Sangh is closely associated with the
Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (B>J5) , which was founded in 1955 by Daltopant Fapurao
Thengade. The initial Conference declared the EMS to be the "labour front of
the Jana Sangh." The BMS has continued but has achieved no notable gain in
membership and is not recognized by the Government of India as one of the
four national labour federations. 51 The reason for this relative unimpor-
tance may be attributed to the fact that the connection of the Jana Sangh is
mainly with shopkeepers, small industrialists and professional people who are
not good prospects as sponsors of labour fronts.
The Jana Sangh is becoming active among women voters. The first woman
to be elected on the Jana Sangh ticket was Mrs. Shakuntala Nayar in Uttar
Pradesh in 1962. The Working Committee first had a woman in its membership
at the Ambala Session in 1958. Since then, off and on, women have held posi-
tions in the Jana Sangh organization. A Nahila Sammelan (Women's Conference)
has become a regular part of the Jana Sangh annual Convention. Mrs, Kamala
Madhok (wife of Professor Balraj Madhok, a prominent member from Delhi),
urged the Sammelan in 1958 to "wrest the leadership of Indian womanhood from
the hands of a few Westernized fashionable ladies. "52
The Organizer is a weekly published both in Hindi and English, from
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Delhi, is largely RSS controlled, and at times can be extremely anti-Muslim.
However, it vividly reports all Jana Sangh national conventions and related
news. Other publications are the Hindi weekly Pancha.janya of Lucknow, which
is also RSS controlled. Outside the directly controlled press, one Urdu
daily in Delhi which has often supported the Jana Sangh is Pratap . It was
founded in Lahore by Manashya Krishan, a staunch Arya Samajist, and now, is
run by his sons from Delhi and Jullundar.
After observing the overall structural components of the party it is
important for our discussion of 'party appeal' to consider the characteris-
tics of Jana Sangh membership. The appeal of the party is greater to
various dislocated or dispossessed segments of the population
refugees from Pakistan, former princely state retainers, and many
lower middle class elements, such as lesser Rajputs, landholders,
smaller businessmen and shopkeepers, traders and the like, 53
rather than to people in the rural areas. It would seem that the slogan of a
united Hindu people would appeal easily to the simple minded villager, but
this is not so. One reason for the failure to appeal to the rural areas, can
be the deep entrenchment of the Congress party since pre-independence days.
Moreover, the Congress party still has the lustre symbolised by Gandhiji and
Pandit Nehru. In addition to the above, the platform of a militant Hinduism
is alien to most of these people. On the other hand, refugees, former
princely retainers, lesser landlords, and others mentioned above, are the
ones most affected by the new order, and may be searching for a distinctive
cohesiveness. The Jana Sangh is able to supply these with a religious and
traditional affiliation, a status and role as members id.thin the party. The
concentration of Jana Sangh membership in urban areas can partly be attributed
to its historical foundations. Western influence was more or less concen-
trated in the growing towns and it is here that the revivalist reaction to
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Westernization originated. Besides, "dislocated" and "dispossessed" people
would naturally cone to the urban areas to find employment, or make a new
beginning, and would thus be more in search for a new identity. The Jana
Sangh has capitalized on this, and concentrates on gaining control of civic
bodies. In the General Election of 19^7 » it was able to capture control of
the Municipal corporation of the city of Delhi. It seemed ironic that in the
capital city where the Congress party controlled the National Parliament, it
was unable to control the civic administration of the city.
Earlier in the discussion the question of leadership was mentioned.
An overall effect of the differentiated party organization is to ensure that
leadership in the party can be handed down peacefully and continuity in party
organization can be maintained. This aspect the Jana Sangh organization has
encountered with particular success in at least two emergency situations
—
once in 195^ when Dr. Mookerjee suddenly died while participating in the
Kashmir satyagraha (passive resistance), and for a second time in 195^ when
the President Mauli Chandra Sharraa resigned from the party because he opposed
the RSS organizational control of the party. Both times leadership was suc-
cessfully handed down.
A very important issue to the Jana Sangh organization is factionalism
within the party ranks. Factionalism^ has been described as the existence
of internal party conflict, by which two or more points of view may be sup-
ported within the party. Often this difference of opinion may lead to intense
competition for obtaining party tickets for elections at all levels, and may
in some cases lead to the formation of splinter groups that oppose the party
and this costs votes to both groups. To this date, factionalism of this kind
has been absent from the Jana Sangh, whereas there are two Socialist parties,
3^
two Communist parties, and various Congress party factions. The reason for
the Jana Sangh being factionless is largely the influence of the RSS. Those
members of the RSS who join the Jana Sangh have already been trained to
adhere to discipline and the policy line. Since the RSS does not allow any
dissension in its ranks, these members when they join the Jana Sangh bring to
it the discipline they have incorporated in their RSS training. Those mem-
bers who do not come up through the RSS ranks often may find themselves feel-
ing restless under the RSS yoke. This minority group, in order to keep the
party image, accept a majority decision and by adding their own consent make
it unanimous. At this juncture it would have been extremely pertinent to
present the number of total membership in the Jana Sangh, and also examine
the percentage of RSS and non-RSS members, but these figures are not readily
available, as it is the party's intention not to expose its close affiliation
with the RSS.
The role of the organization of the Jana Sangh becomes more important
when it is considered that the party has increased its representation in
Parliament and in the Legislative Assemblies in each successive General Elec-
tion, especially in view of the fact that it has not had the advantage of a
powerful charismatic leader for a continued length of time as the Congress
party has had. Hence the debit side would seem to lie in the dedication of
the workers, and the organization and ideology of the party that they espouse,
CHAPTER IV
PARTY IDEOLOGY
In general, ideology refers to those principles that fona the guide-
lines for the conduct of party members in connection with the political party.
It links the actions of members of a political party to a wider set of mean-
ings and by doing so lends a dignified complexion to social conduct. It can
on the other hand, also become a cloak for less honorable motives. The
description of an ideology tends to make it seen less abstract than the actual
abstractions contained within it, and gives moral prescription to collectiv-
ities. In developing countries at least ideology helps to perform two main
functions: one social, binding the community together, and the other indi-
vidual, organizing role personalities of the maturing individual. Both these
help to legitimize authority. 55
In the social solidarity aspect, ideology can help to create a myth
that may be based on a superior historical perspective, that aids in bringing
together people who accept this general myth, though they may differ on sub-
tle issues. On the individual level, ideology is able to satisfy the identity
function among individuals. By helping people to identify with a certain
ideology, it binds them together, and they then promote the authority of that
ideology. The Jana Sangh seems to perform all these functions. Under its
banner all Hindus can be organized as a collectivity and thus the party pro-
motes solidarity among them; for those involved in an identity crisis between
the traditional and the modern the Jana Sangh helps to provide at least one
kind of stable source of identity. Party ideology thus establishes a basis
of authority that the party exercises. Furthermore the ideology of the party
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becomes important in augmenting the strength of the party, attracting and
helping to recruit greater numbers of people into its fold. All this assumes
importance in that it increases electoral support of the party and enhances
the possibility of its victory at the polls. One further factor why the
study of ideology is particularly relevant to this paper is that it may be
possible to observe certain trends or instances where increased participation
by the party in the political system has resulted in a flexibility of party
ideology especially in regard to communalism. Do the actions taken by party
leaders correspond to their ideological standing, or are there some confused
issues? Where does the appeal of the party ideology lie, and to whom does it
appeal and why? The answers to these questions may lead to clues about the
base of party membership.
The main sources of information of Jana Sangh party ideology is from
election manifestoes, issued prior to the each of the four general, elections
of 1952, 1957i 1962, and I967, The manifestoes reveal not only what the
party positions are on various subjects, but also the changing trends in Jana
Sangh policy. They also show the slogans which are adopted to suit a parti-
cular election but later incorporated in party policy. As such manifestoes
tend to indicate the flexibility in the party ideology, the mood of the lead-
ership at a given election, the target population for party appeal. It
should not be understood that the manifestoes are the only sources of infor-
mation on party ideology as frequently other forms of writings and speeches
by the party leaders are also important. For the purpose of analysis, party
ideology has been discussed under two major sections of this chapter the first
dealing with the domestic and the second treating the foreign policies.
Since it is important to review closely the party's ideological stand on the
3?
status of minorities, a part of the domestic section is devoted to this
purpose.
a . Domestic Policy
The major Jana Sangh policies ware contained in the eight-point pro-
gram presented by Dr. Hooker jee when he announced formation of the Peoples
Party on May 5i 1951 in Calcutta. The program was as follows:
1. a united India, i.e. reversal of partition.
2. "reciprocity instead of appeasement" in relation with Pakistan.
3. "a more independent attitude in matters of foreign policy con-
sistent with Bharat's paramount self interest".
4. rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan.
5» increased agricultural and industrial production.
6. "maintenance and development of a common culture for the whole
country based on Bhartiya Sanskriti and maryada .
7. equal rights for all citizens, and improvement of "socially and
economically backward classes", and
8. a local issue, "the equitable readjustment of the boundaries of
West Bengal". $6
In the party manifesto of 1951 > the Jana Sangh, then newly formed from
its precursor, the People's Party, stated its "fundamentals" as "one country,
one nation, one culture and rule of law."
By putting the emphasis on a Bharatiya rashtra and culture, the Jana
Sangh tries to project an Indian image. How different Bharatiya rashtra is
from a Hindu rashtra it is difficult to say. The Jana Sangh does not for
example make a clear distinction between Hindu citizens and other citizens,
yet some of the measures it advocates, e.g., Gurukul system of education, and
Aryuvedic medicine, are drawn from the Hindu tradition. The Jana Sangh makes
no conscious effort to draw upon any other. At the same time, the dilemma
can also be seen as a real difficulty in differentiating between Hindu com-
munalism and Indian nationalism. Therefore it becomes easy to equate Hindu
with Indian.
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On basic economic policy, the party made fewer comments, but instead
proposed in some detail principles for land and industry* The Jana Sangh saw
the provision of "food, clothing and shelter," as "the most pressing economic
problem before the country." It added, "the middle class, which is worst
hit, has to be saved to avoid a breakdown of the entire intellectual and cul-
tural activity. "57 As stated before, by making such policy statements, the
party was asking for the support in both funds and votes of the urban Hindu
middle class.
Under the heading "land policy" the Jana Sangh proposed a number of
steps many of them essential for the increase of agricultural production:
consolidation of holding, better seeds, small irrigation and tube-well proj-
ects, greater mechanization. One step which was omitted was the increased
use of chemical fertilizers because, "chemical fertilizers, if they are not
mixed with green manures in proper proportions and if the land in which they
ar6 put is not properly irrigated, destroy the fertility of land and make it
barren within few years, "5° This argument seems to be an attempt to work on
the unfounded fears of the farmers, more to obtain their sympathy rather than
to make them aware of the proper advantages and disadvantages of the use of
chemical fertilizer application. To fulfill the nutrient requirement of
crops greater use of natural manures was suggested. However, in a country
such as India where most of the organic natural refuse is used either as fod-
der or as fuel for cooking, such a suggestion seems quite infeasible. Simi-
larly, the party opposes such measures as the ECG vaccination for tuberculo-
sis. To popularize new methods among the farmers, the Jana Sangh called for
the use of "bands of volunteer workers", using the Hindi term swayamsevak,
though apparently, not in the RSS sense.
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The party gave some support to land reform, but tried to couch it in
such terms that would not frighten away any landlords who might be inclined
otherwise to join tho Jana Sangh. The Hindu landlord in Uttar Pradesh has
generally been a person of conservative religious and social views, and 1:1
his counterpart in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh formed a base of support for
the Jana Sangh. "The party would like to take all steps to introduce land
reforms, so as to make the cultivator the virtual owner of the land." Pre-
sumably, this meant the legal ownership of the land would remain with the
zamindar, but the cultivator would be given guaranteed tenancy and receive an
increased share of the produce. However, the party did say:
If it found essential in the interest of the economy of the country
the party would abolish Jagirdari and Zamindari with compensation
and distribute the land to the tillers . . . Enough land however
would be left with such Zamindars and Jagirdars as would settle
dovm as land owning farmers. 59
The land section included:
The party stands pledged to the prohibition of cow slaughter.
Special steps will be taken to improve breeds of cow, to make it
an economic unit in our agricultural life. °
V/hile the land policy tried to steer a middle course between conserv-
atism and radicalism, the industrial policy did the same. The party stands
for public ownership of industries especially catering to the essential
defense needs of the country. As for other large industries , state ownership
had generally not worked efficiently and economically in this country. The
Jana Sangh "will encourage private enterprise instead of talking vaguely
about nationalism," Expansion, however, should be "under the general control
and regulation of the state in the interest of consumers and producers alike."
Industry should be decentralized, both to alleviate crowding in the cities
and it "will also be advisable from the point of view of defense."
^0
In 195^» the Pratinidhi Sabha had its session in Indore, in the shadow
of Kookerjee's death. The Jana Sangh was deprived of its ablest and most
widely known member."! He was succeeded by Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma who
had been the General Secretary. However, he (Sharma) clashed with the RSS
dominated wing of the party and resigned on November 3» 1953 * his main cori-
plaint being that the RSS wanted to take over the party. c At this session,
the Pratinidhi Sabha criticised Sharma and issued a new manifesto for the
Party. "3 The new program "contained a number of radical changes, some of
which were short lived, and strengthened some other provisions," The most
radical provisions came under the heading of economic policy where seven
points were emphasized. The party proposed that the Fundamental Rights of
the Constitution should include the right to work; cottage industries should
be encouraged and saved from competition; foreign capital was welcome, with-
out political strings, and should allow 2/3 Indian participation; labour
should receive some profits from industry; though labour has the right to
strike, this should only be a last resort; minimum and maximum wage should be
established; and, finally, zamindari, should be abolished immediately without
compensation to the zamindars. The most radical of all the changes suggested
was the abolition of zamindari without compensation. The reason why this was
proposed is not clear, as the Jana Sangh obtains considerable support from
zamindars, but the fact that the issue was "fuzzed" later shows that Jana
Sangh was not necessarily earnest in proposing it.
On the socio-political side the manifesto also made changes. The 195^
Manifesto contained the proposal for a unitary system of government. This
can bo justified by the rising tide of sub-national tendencies which has
divided the country into linguistic states. The Jana Sangh proposed the
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elimination of the State governments as a stratum between the district and
central government. The party suggested the election of Jsnapada councils at
the district level and the further development of the Panchayat raj. However
this ideal has persisted in the Jana Sangh liturgy, though the party has
utilized the state system for electoral and parliamentary purposes. This
proposal of unitary system government was looked upon with suspicion by other
political groups.
The real idea behind Jana Sangh* s policy is that they want to use
the power of a unitary state not to promote a democratic unity,
which is unity in diversity, but rather to baild a unity which one
religion, one culture, and one language dictate to others."^
The idea of a unitary state does not seem very possible at present for
two major reasons. Firstly, because the parties in power at the state and
center level are not the same and one would not surrender political power to
the other. These parties in the state have been successful in awakening
regional loyalties and coercion of people into a unitary state does not seem
democratic or possible. In addition, a strong leader to create a unitary
state is not visible on the political horizon.
Before the 1957 Manifesto was issued the following topics came up for
consideration—The Christian Missionaries, Goa, Cow slaughter, the Hindu Code
Bill and States reorganization.
The Niyogi Committee, officially the Christian Missionary Activities
Enquiry Committee on Madhya Pradesh was appointed in 195^ to study the mis-
sion work in that State. A similar body, the Rege Committee, was set up in
Madhya Bharat. The report of the committee came out squarely against mis-
sionary activity, and hinted that such activity had political overtones. It
suggested among other measures, that missionary activity be checked, and the
Indian churches should establish an independent and united Christian Church
^2
in India, The Constitution should be amended to make it clear that the right
to propogate a religion is available to Indian citizens only. The Jana Sangh
saw dangers from Christian missionary activities not only in Madhya Pradesh
and Madhya Bharat, bat, also among the tribals of Assam, Bihar and Orissa,
The Jana Sangh has essentially an anti-Christian outlook, vrhich was recently
demonstrated in its negative attitudes towards Cardinal Gracias of Bombay and
the visit of Pope Paul to India in 19&5
•
The Jana Sangh and the RSS designated October 26, 1952, Anti-Cow
Slaughter Day and began the collection of signatures for a petition. The
Jana Sangh ritually but not regularly passes resolutions on the subject.
Coupled with the Jana Sangh demand for banning cow slaughter was a nebulous
proposal for upgrading the quality of the cattle in India. There is no doubt
that the matter is one of deep feeling for the party, which in this gained
not only the support of the other Hindu parties, but also of many within the
Congress, such as Seth Govind Das, Purushottam Das Tandon and Thakur Das
Bhargava
.
The Hindu Code Bill (1955-56) also engaged much of the time of the
Jana Sangh and the other Hindu Parties. The Jana Sangh opposed the codifica-
tion of the traditional Hindu law, while Prime Minister Nehru considered the
bills a key issue in his regime. The Jana Sangh charged the Congress with
communalism to attack the measures. In short, said the Jana Sangh and its
allies, any bill which applies to only one community has no place in a secu-
lar state. Any codification should apply equally to all communities. There
is certainly justification in the Jana Sangh charge of communalism, because,
till I968 there has been no codification of the civil law for any other
community.
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With regard to states reorganization and the Akali demand for a Pun-
jabi Suba, the Jana Sangh opposed a separate Punjabi Suba, The Akalis had
worked closely with Kookerjee in Parliament and in the Kashmir satyagraha.
The Jana Sangh placed before the Commission a demand for a Maha-Punjab, which
would include Punjab, PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh. The party combined its
state units into a Maha-Punjab Jana Sangh and held to that position until the
bitter end, an end which saw the creation of the Punjabi Suba in I966.
The 1957 Manifesto"* was basically the same in philosophy and program
as that presented to the electorate in 1952. Ealraj Madhok wrote of the Jana
Sangh:
Jana Sangh aims at democracy nationalism, unitary form of government
and full integration of Jammu and Kashmire State with the rest of
India, together with greater attention to national defence, in the
political side. Its economic objectives are a fair deal to the com-
mon man through abolition of sales tax and reduction in other direct
taxes, appointment of a National Wage Board and guarantee of eco-
nomic work to all through decentralization of economic power and a
fair field for free enterprise, . .Along with safeguarding democracy,
Jana Sangh aims at strengthening the forces of nationalism and
unity to checkmate the separatist forces from within and the forces
of aggression from without.""
But looking at the details we do find some differences. The 1957
Manifesto continued the call for the abolition of zamindari, but obscured the
question by saying zamindars should be "rehabilitated," In domestic policy,
the manifesto added a specific demand that the Preventive Detention Act be
repealed. (Opposition parties in India usually demand this, because the pro-
visions of the Act are most often used against them.) Mookerjee had led the
opposition to the renewal of the act while he led the National Democratic
Party in Parliament. The Party also found that the Legislative Councils, the
upper houses in States to be expensive additions to the legislative machinery.
The party supported the separation of the judiciary from the executive by
l&
taking the magisterial powers away from the district collectors and deputy
commissioners.
The party now endorsed an encouragement of union membership for indus-
trial workers. In July 1955 1 "the Jana Sangh had started its own affiliated
labor organization, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh. The Party now called for
further Indianization of foreign companies and for the complete Indianization
in capital and management of plantation industries. The party would place a
limit on the repatriation of capital and earnings by foreign owned companies.
The Jana Sangh statement on national unity was:
For the preservation of national unity:
1, Creating a feeling of equality and oneness in the Hindu society
by liquidating urrcouchability and caste-ism.
2. Nationalising all non-Hindus by inculcating in them the idea of
Bharatiya Culture.
The recommendations of the Ni^p_gi Committee and the Rege Committee
will be implemented to free Bharatiya Christians from the national
influence of foreign missionaries, '
The party also labelled the Akali Dal demand for the Punjabi Suba, the
Dravidistan Movement (which has now been withdrawn by the DMX) and the Naga
rebellion as anti-national.
It is important to discuss two events which occurred on the Indian
political scene which would assist in viewing the 19&2 Manifesto properly.
The Congress Session at Nagpur in 1959 t proclaimed Cooperative farming as one
of its major goals, and in August of the same year, the Swatantra Party (a
conservative opposition party) was formed under the leadership of Chakravarti
Rajagopalachari.°° He had been Governor General of India, and twice Chief
Minister of the state of Madras.
In January 1959. the Jana Sangh in a thirteen point program stated its
policy on agriculture. °9 Among the points were: equal application of the
land ceilings in all states, special efforts to bring waste land under
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cultivation, o-./nership of land by the cultivator who would pay compensation
based on ten times the annual rent to the dispossessed landlords, a "crash
program" on tube-veils, increased use of cov; dung as manure and less depend-
ence on "dangerous" chemical fertilizers, the setting aside in each village
of a common grazing area and the encouragement of cooperative societies for
such matters as credit, seed development, and marketing, but this has to be
done with a minimum of government interference. This was in fact a progres-
sive program, as was seen from later events, especially when the monsoons
failed, and many of these suggestions would have been of value if they had
been implemented. While the Jana Sangh therefore did not oppose in principle
the Congress program of land reform and land ceilings it carre out very
strongly in opposition to collectivization of holdings as proposed by the
Congress party in Nagpur.
The reaction of the Jana Sangh to a new party, the Svatantra Party,
which could be considered its (the Jana Sangh 1 s) rival, was skeptical.
Organiser '^ editorially "welcomed" the new party but wondered whether it
could add or detract from the work of the Jana Sangh and of conservative
policies in general. The paper also saw a weakness in the new party's lack
of workers and surfeit of name politicians. Balraj Madhok took a critical
view of the party:
In the South Shri C. Rajagopalachari has been advocating for some
time the formation of a new conservative party which may act as a
brake on the Congress party and work for preserving and conserving
what is good in the traditional Indian way of life...The economic
programme of the proposed middle-of-the-road party of Ilr. Masani
and the role visualised for the "brake" party of conception by
C. R. , however do not seem to be much different from. ..the,
Bharatiya Jana Sangh. As such ideologically there is little scope
or need for the creating of any such new party except that it will
provide a new platform to the intellectual and economic aristoc-
racy which is finding itself out of tune with the new rhyme of the
ruling party but considers it below its dignity to join th9 ranks
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of tho Jana Sangh...
The one good that such a party can and nay do is to create a better
understanding and appreciation for the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which
has already wade its mark as a forward-looking and opon minded con-
servative party of India. The Jana Sangh circles, therefore, are
indifferent about the formation of such a party though they would
like all those who sincerely feel the need for it to study Bharatiya
Jana Sangh more closely and objectively before plumping for a new
party. 71
Since then, as will be seen later, the Jana Sangh has at times allied
with the Swatantra, though there have been some basic differences on specific
issues such as the language question.
In this period preceding the third election there also occurred severe
communal riots between the Hindu and Muslim communities in Jabalpur end
Raipur in Kadhya Pradesh. The Jana Sangh was accused along with the RSS of
stirring up the trouble, but there has been no proof that the Jana Sangh or
RSS as organizations were instrumental in communal riots. The aftermath of
the riots produced the appointment of a committee headed by Ajit Prasad Jain
to consider means to ban communal parties. The committee called for legis-
lative means to ban communal parties, but the suggestions of the committee
have not been put into legislation. The Congress party which initiated this
move found it possible though, to ally with the Sikh Akali Dal in Punjab in
1957 and with the Muslim League in Kerala in i960, both of which represent
separate communities.
In the I962 Manifesto the party reaffirmed its opposition to the Pre-
ventive Detention Act. It also repeated its demand for the elimination of
the Legislative Councils, although it had members in the directly elected
Andhra Pradesh and Mysore without having members in the directly elected
assemblies. Again the unitary form of government was proposed, at least in
theory, with democratic decentralization to the district level. Hindi should
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be the national language and the language of communication between the states;
the regional languages should, be used within the state. An Indian system of
education should be developed which would accept much of the gnrukul methods
and reject much of the Western. These methods were not explained in det-s.il.
Economics received more attention than in earlier Jana Sangh manifes-
toes. The Policies proposed agreed in most respects with the policies of the
Swatantra Party and where they differed it was mainly a question of emphasis
and not of substance. The party would continue planning but would curtail
the powers of the Planning Commission. Agriculture would be given the high-
est priority with small-scale and rural industries given second priority. In
the agricultural sector: "All possible steps will be taken to free agricul-
ture from its dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon." The party proposed
a crash program of small irrigation works including tube wells, the damming
of rivulets, and the building of storage tanks. It also called for immediate
revision and improvement of the drainage system and for the repair and rechan-
neling of existing major canal systems. This was all to be done with a
decrease in water rates and no provision was made for alternative sources of
revenue to finance the projects. However, with the serious monsoon failures
in several of the years since the I962 election and the failure of the Con-
gress Party to cope adequately with the problem, it is possible the Jana
Sangh proposals, if carried out, might have gone far to save the disaster of
famine
.
The party came out in opposition to the Nehru-proposed joint coopera-
tive farming program of the Congress, a program which has, in any event,
never gotten off the ground. Voluntary service cooperatives received the
party's support but they should be free from government control. The party
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also desired that increased attention be given to forests, not only for forest
products but for the curtailing of erosion and improvement of soil. "The
Bharatiya Jana Sangh vrill amend the Constitution to prohibit the slaughter of
the bovine species..." Again the Hindu basis of the Jana Sangh comes out in
the perennial demand for the preservation of the cow, whether healthy or dis-
eased, whether useful or a pai'asite on limited food supplies.
In the area of social policies, the Jana Sangh hinted at a change in
its total opposition to the Hindu Code Bill: "Without changing fundamentally
the age-old scientific principles of social organization, the Jana Sangh will
enlarge and make more substantial the property rights of women." Tn medicine
the Jana Sangh reverted to Hindu traditionalism and supported "Aryuveda" as
the national system of medicine.
Before the general election of 19^7i the Jana Sangh at its Vijayawada
session, adopted a new policy statement which primarily endorsed its well
known policies. '^ This also contained a philosophical statement which
attempted to relate modern democracy to Hindu traditions. While devotion to
Bharatiya sanskriti and maryada was restated, the object of the party was to
be the attainment of Dharma Rajya: "The nearest English equivalent of Dharma
Rajya is the Rule of Law." Dharma Rajya can be attained only through democ-
racy; the institutional form can vary from time to time and from country to
country. The remainder of the document spelled out specific matters, which
if implemented would carry out the basic program^ In the 19&7 manifesto,'
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the Jana Sangh emphasized foreign policy and called for liberation of lost
territory and an independent foreign policy and strong measures of defence,
even the manufacture of nuclear weapons and missiles. In domestic issues, it
called for national unity, equality, and renewed its demand for decentraliza-
tion and reform of the judiciary. On the language policy which was becoming
^9
very important in the political scene, it indicated that the use of English
should be discontinued in the schooling system—the languages should be the
mother tongue, Hindi and Sanskrit; a modern Indian language being prescribed
for those whose mother tongue is Hindi. The study of foreign languages would
be optional. Sanskrit would be declared the country's national language and
used on special occasions. Hindi and provincial languages will be used by
the Center where the Center has to directly communicate with the States.
Otherwise, Hindi would be used at the central level, with the option to use
English for ten years for those who have not learned Hindi. At the provin-
cial level the regional language will be the official language. The Jana
Sangh volunteered to prepare a common scientific terminology for all the
Indian languages.
In the industrial sphere, the party called for the decentralising of
industrial units that can be established with internal resources, and indus-
tries needing foreign exchange need not be expanded until they were working
in full capacity. It put itself on record as opposed to nationalisation of
private sector industries, and any nationalization should be taken on the
recommendation of a judicial commission. It further called for a Tax Enquiry,
and drastic economy in government expenditure. From its economic stance, it
seems that the Jana Sangh was becoming more openminded—however, it partici-
pated vigorously in the anti-cow slaughter demonstrations in Delhi, and con-
tinued its attack on Pakistan.
Minorities
The question of the Jana Sangh position toward minorities, particu-
larly towards Muslims, was raised in the first Manifesto and has been raised
regularly throughout the history of the party. The Manifesto of 1951 said
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that the party did not recognize religious minorities. The policy that the
Jana Sangh has continued to maintain was stated by Sharma in Nagpur, Octo-
ber 29, 1951 • He acknowledged that there were Muslims in the Jana Sangh, but
added that the party would not beg persons of any religion to join the party
simply to give it a national character. The typical position of the Jana
Sangh was stated thus:
The Jana Sangh considers them (Muslims) flesh of our flesh, the
blood of our blood. That is its basic unalterable attitude toward
them, the Jana Sangh invites them to accept our hand of brother-
hood. It expects them to shed all those complexes which mutlitate
against this brotherhood. It looks forward to their disassociating
foreign ways from the tenets of their religion. They are welcome
to worship the Islamic way. They are expected to live the Bharatiya
way. 7**
In the Manifesto of 19^2, the Jana Sangh spoke of nationalizing all
non-Hindus by inculcating in them the idea of a Bharatiya culture, and free-
ing Bharatiya Christians from the anti-national influence of foreign mission-
aries. Some of the measures that could be used to achieve this nationaliza-
tion of the minorities could be the use of Indian names by Muslims and
Christians, the establishment of a United Church for Indian Christians, and
perhaps changing the Urdu script. The question of the Hindu minority,
especially in East Pakistan, and the migration of refugees from there has
received a sympathetic attitude in the Jana Sangh. They have always spoken
for proper rehabilitation of refugees from East Pakistan saying that it is
the duty of the government to provide adequately for them.
The whole question of the Jana Sangh' s attitude towards the minorities
has often led the party to be characterized as communal—that is representing
the interests of the Hindus in the country. The Jana Sangh generally refutes
this by arguing that it is a national party, not a Hindu party; its member-
ship is open to all communities, and the party principally stands for a
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Bharatiya rashtra, not a Hindu rashtra. The Party has sponsored non-Hindu
candidates in the elections; it has had a Christian President in the Madras
unit; has had National Presidents who have been other than Hindi speakers.
Hoi rover, leadership and membership of the party is overwhelmingly from the
Hindi Heartland. Thus
the differences in adjectives and in membership policy may be tech-
nical, but they cannot be totally ignored and have been stated in
different terms deliberately. ?5
On the other hand, the Jana Sangh has attacked the Congress for being
communal because it sponsored the Hindu Code Bill of 1955 » t>7 which Hindu la-^
was codified by the government, but a similar Code has not been legalized for
other ccmnunities, even though such was promised over a decade ago. The Jana
Sangh has labelled the government's secular policy as being one of Muslim
appeasement. The Jana Sangh constantly quotes the Congress-Muslim League
alliance in Kerala after the I962 elections. Yet, at times the Jana Sangh
itself has found it expedient to ally with groups which it calls communal and
separatist, e.g., the Akali Dal in the Punjab, and also the Communist and
Socialist Parties. The alliance with the Akali Dal is one prime example in
which participation in the political sphere had led to a flexibility in alli-
ances. It is also significant that the Jana Sangh does not see eye to eye
with the Shiv Sena,'" which has evolved as the spokesman for Hindu Maratha
nationalism since the mid sixties in the State of Maharashtra. In fact, the
Shiv Sena and the Jana Sangh have opposed each other in the. Thana Municipal
elections. The reasons for this difference have not been made absolutely
clear, but the Shiv Sena claims that the Jana Sangh has not done anything in
particular for the Kaharashtrians . The Jana Sangh may see the Shiv Sena as a
rival for Hindu sympathy, especially in view of the fact that the Jana Sangh
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has not received ovewhelming support in Maharashtra due to the party's lead-
ership being in the hands of the Brahr.ians, while the Congress party leader-
ship is in the hands of the dominant Maratha caste. But the position of the
Jana Sangh depends in a large measure on its relationship with the RSS, It
in a welcome trend that the Jana Sangh was beginning to show signs of a cer-
tain amount of independence from the RSS in seeking broader alliances, with
other parties and the leadership of the party is in more pragmatic hands. At
the same time it is important to remember, that the RSS provides the Jana
Sangh with a well trained and disciplined group of workers. They are very
efficient in times of elections for socialization purposes and are seldom
found to dissent with the views of the Party, This absence of factionalism
is a decided advantage to the Jana Sangh especially vrhen it is compared to
the factionalism of the Congress party. The factionalism in the Congress
party has led to fragmantation and loss of power. Yet, there is also a nega-
tive aspect to this relationship. The RSS is more doctrinaire and openly
communal than the Jana Sangh, and the Jana Sangh association with it thus
tarnishes the name of the Jana Sangh too. It seems from press reports'' that
at present the RSS control over the Jana Sangh has grown not only organisa-
tionally, but also in the sphere of policy. This trend would not be favour-
able to a detente with minority communities like the Muslims and the
Christians, or to any relaxation on the language policy.
Conclusion
The Jana Sangh' s basic philosophy is the ideal of a modern society set
in the background of the ancient culture of India. This then leads to certain
contradictions that arise particularly because the party retains certain tra-
ditional demands in order to cater to the desires of its membership base.
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This base of Jana Sangh membership is concentrated in the urban middle class,
and petty land owners. The Jana Sangh has been solicitous of retaining their
support, and this explains its implicit stand on land ownership. The party
has not recommended the total ownership of land by the tillers of the soil.
Although increased food production and population control are two stated pri-
orities by the party for the development and prosperity of India, however,
the Jana Sangh does not stress these to any appreciable extent. Education
and language policy are two other spheres in which it supports traditional
demands: a "gurukul" system of education that prevailed in Ancient India,
and the emphasis on Hindi and Sanskrit as national languages. It is doubtful
if the Jana Sangh' s demand for Sanskrit is considered seriously by other
parties; but the strict line on Hindi will have to be reconsidered by the
Jana Sangh if the party desires to expand its inf3.uonce in Southern India.
Keeping the study of foreign language as "optional" will have serious reper-
cussions in terms of India's contacts with the developed world. This problem
can become acute in the spheres of scientific as well as other aspects of
studies abroad, A more pragmatic approach will have to be taken on the lan-
guage issue if the Jana Sangh seriously desires expansion in the South.
On the other hand, there are certain issues on which the Jana Sangh
has been more pragmatic: electoral alliances. Those whom the Jana Sangh has
labelled "communal" it has not found totally unacceptable as political part-
ners. For example the Akali Dal and the Jana Sangh supported different
demands for the establishment of a Punjabi Suba, yet at present it is the
Akali Dal and Jana Sangh that have joined together to form that state's gov-
ernment. The Jana Sangh has also worked with the Socialist and the Communist
parties at different times. Perhaps this is the influence of "integral
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humanism", propounded by the late Deen Dayal Upadhyaya leading to such dis-
play of an integrated approach. Another pragmatic change has been observed
in the party's attitude to the Hindu Code Bill, where it has accepted to a
slight extent the position of women as stated in the Act, though total accep-
tance would be impossible. Moreover, the Jana Sangh has made some tangible
proposals especially the stress on agriculture in the I962 election manifesto.
On the whole in the last sixteen years Jana Sangh* s domestic ideology
seems to have moved slightly from a socio- cultural emphasis to an economic
emphasis. The two most frequent criticisms of Jana Sangh ideology ware the
lack of an economic program, and the Jana Sangh' s being representative of
communal interests, Earlier discussion has shown that the Jana Sangh does
stand for the interest of Hindus, However, other communal elements e.g.
Muslim League and Akali Dal are not attacked as vehemently by the Congress
party as the Jana Sangh is, and in India the word communal has tended to have
only a negative connotation. This should not be necessarily so. The fact
that the party for the sake of political expediency has not acted completely
in espousal of the principles it advocates, especially in the sphere of elec-
toral alliances, is a welcome trend,
b. Foreign Policy
Foreign policy in India assumes an important place because of India's
geopolitical significance?" between the Eastern and Western bloc and her
proximity to the People's Republic of China, Moreover, her own developmental
needs and acute problems of population and food place her in a position where
she must act in her best interests too.
The foreign policy views of the opposition are important because they
reflect what position the party will take if and when it comes to power. The
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opposition in India is weak; its remoteness from power leads to extremist
positions; and its policy may have low saliency for the people. Yet, the
steady rise of the Jana Sangh since 1951 makes its foreign policy views
important t (Though the chances of the Jana Sangh becoming the party in power
are slim due to its limited appeal in the South,)
During the years 19^7~19^ » when Mr. Nehru was Prime Minister of India
and since he also held the Foreign Policy portfolio, he was India's most
important spokesman in foreign affairs. "Right wing sentiment was latent
because of his towering personality and commitment to socialist rhetoric. "7°
But new ground was broken by the birth of the Sxratantra Party in 1959 » the
ouster of Krishna Menon, Defense Minister (often accused of having Communist
tendencies) , and the motion of no confidence in 19&3 were grox-ring signs of
right wing activity.
The foreign policy views of the Jana Sangh are essentially those of
nonalignment, but it believes that the implementation of policy has relegated
the national interest to a subordinate position. The implication is that
though India has achieved fame in her actions in Korea, and played an impor-
tant part in the Congo operation, the nonalignment policy has not brought
positive results in connection with her immediate foreign policy concerns;
e.g. Pakistan and China. The Jana Sangh advocated "non-involvement, "°® in
affairs that do not directly affect India. Mr. Atal Behari Vajapayee°l has
criticized the late Prime Minister Nehru's habit of pronouncing on any and
every event or issue in the world.
Therefore the Jana Sangh advocates an independent policy, which means
that India must deal with every country individually, irrespective of blocs,
and choose her friends and allies according to her own assessment of her
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interests. (Basically this is nonalignment) but the Jana Sangh has since the
Chinese invasion of 19&2, moved closer to a stand that nay advocate a pro-
Western alliance.
The Jana Sangh also lays heavy stress on defense needs.
Foreign policy must help in the defense of the country against
the neighbors if they happen to be hostile and aggressive as Com-
munist China and Pakistan are towards India. The search for friends
by India has to be made with an eye on this basic reality of the
Indian situation. °^
The Jana Sangh policy with regard to India's Asian neighbours is the
one that has the more important place in its foreign policy pronouncements,
Pakistan
Pakistan has been a focal point of Jana Sangh proposals on foreign
policy. The party has never accepted the partition of the country that took
place in 19^7. It proposed an "Akhand Bharat. "°3 (undivided India). Akhand
Bharat can be achieved by helping the Muslims of India to shed their separa-
tist outlook, and once they live in amity with India, the raison d'etre of
Pakistan would be lost, and unity of the subcontinent could be achieved.
Since 1951 » when the party was formed, the Jana Sangh has maintained this
point of view. It seems an impractical and unrealistic aim, and shows the
intransigence of the party. In the early years, this repeated demand may
have been possible, but today Pakistan is a country in its own right and on
the way to development. If pressing the demand were to help in keeping the
issue alive and therefore legal, the Akhand Bharat proposal has not been pos-
itive in such achievement. And when such unity cannot be achieved, the
policy of the Jana Sangh would be one of "reciprocity" and not "appeasement,"
The other two areas of foreign policy pronouncements are Kashmir and
West Bengal
. Where Kashmir is concerned, it is in its entirety Indian, by
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virtue of the accession of the Maharaja. There is no question of a plebi-
scite. The only matter remaining to be settled is the full and complete
evacuation by Pakistan of the areas occupied by Pakistan of the Azad Kashmir
government. In this case, unlike in the Akhand Bharat proposal, the steady
repetition of this position has had its effect on the policy of the Govern-
ment of India.
The shift in India's official policy from moral and political
plane to a purely legalistic one—based on Maharaj Hari Singh's sig-
nature on the instrument of accession and the resolution of the
Constituent Assembly of the State—may, at least partly, be attri-
buted to the pressure that the Jana Sangh was able to build up in
the country.^
The Praja Parishad was founded in Kashmir, and advocated the full
integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union. The Parishad
strongly objected to the provision in the Indian constitution (Article 370)
which gave Jammu and Kashmir a special status. It also objected to the per-
mission granted to the State to have its own constitution, unlike any other
state in the India Union. This gave rise to the Parishad war cry!
Ek desh men do vidhan In one country two constitutions
Ek desh men do nishan In one country two flags
Ek desh men do pradhan In one country two Prime Ministers
Nahin chalenge°5 Will not be tolerated.
Being unable to fight the polls, the Parishad decided to offer
satyagraha (passive resistance) in Kashmir. Meanwhile, in April 1952, the
Nehru-Abdullah Pact was signed by which limited accession of Kashmir to the
Indian Union was decided upon. Hookerjee attacked the Pact in Parliament,
and was now to join the Parishad in its activities in Kashmir.
At one point in all the fray, the correspondance between Mookerjee and
Nehru, and Mookerjee and Abdullah, Mookerjee was prepared to consider the
possibility of partition in which Janmu and Ladakh would be fully integrated
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and Kashmir maintained as an autonomous state in the Union. Sensing parti-
tion as inevitable, Mookerjee worked for the partition also of Eengal and the
Punjab, rather than surrender the whole of these two states. Mookerjee had a
degree of pragmatism, and under him the Jana Sangh retained a degree of prag-
matism too. But his venture into Kashmir was short lived, because after he
was arrested while offering satyagraha, he died on June 23, 1953* Hooker-
jee's death and the circumstance surrounding it, have given rise to many
rumours that he was either murdered or when he became sick, was allowed to
die. These allegations have not been substantiated. Soon Sheik Abdullah was
removed from office. (Some attribute this to the effect of Hookerjee's work
in Kashmir.) 8 '
Since then, the Jana Sangh has demanded specifically the recovery of
the territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani occupation.
It has continued to press for the full integration of the state but any
reference to the full integration being applicable to only Jammu and Ladakh
has been omitted. It has consistently demanded the abrogation of Article 370
oo
of the Constitution which gives Kashmir a special status. 00
After the Sino-India conflict of 19^2, a Jana Sangh leader openly
expressed the opinion that partition of the state was the "only practical and
feasible solution of the problem of Kashmir." ^ Madhok left no doubt that he
felt a settlement along the lines he proposed was necessitated by an American
and British desire to see India and Pakistan join in defending the sub-
continent against the Chinese threat. This was a step beyond any Jana Sangh
proposal so far. Since then, the I965 conflict has hardened the attitude of
most Indians on the Kashmir issue. Nonetheless, Madhok* s presidential
address at Jullunder in April 19&6, and the resolutions passed there contain
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no spocific demand that Pakistan yield the areas on her side of the cease-
fire line. It therefore seems possible that the experiences of August and
September, 19&5 » have convinced even the Jana Sangh that recapturing the
areas of the state occupied by Pakistan is for all intents and purposes
impractical. Perhaps, when Pakistan comes to a similar conclusion that she
cannot force India to a plebiscite, negotiations can take place. This step
should bo seen as really a maturing of Jana Sangh policy on one of the topics
closest to its heart. It definitely is a rational attitude they now take.
The refugee question in East Bengal is another issue with Pakistan.
Hookerjee had resigned from the Nehru Cabinet in 1950 because he felt that
the Nehru-Liaqat Ali Pact was not fair to the refugees who came to India.
The Jana Sangh acknowledges that the rehabilitation of refugees is legally
the responsibility of the Indian government, but demands that full compensa-
tion be given for property left by displaced persons in Pakistan.
The Jana Sangh has never been fully reconciled to the Nehru-Noon Agree -
ment of 1953 « The agreement provided for the division of the Berubari Union
on the East Pakistan-India border. The Jana Sangh has argued that portions
of Berubari that went to Pakistan were "given away" without consulting the
people of the region. The issue is still pending, because several court
cases have been filed alleging the agreement to be in violation of the Indian
Constitution.
The Tashkent Agreement of 1966, by which the I965 hostilities between
India and Pakistan were mediated by the U.S.S.R. was considered a great
betrayal too. President Ayub Khan faced a barrage of criticism in his coun-
try; so did Prime Minister Shastri—only he was not there, personally to
brave the attacks which were sobered by the fact of his tragic death in
Tashkent.
6o
The most recant issue between India and Pakistan in which the Jana
Sangh has taken active interest is the Kutch agreement of I968. It was an
internationally arbitrated dispute, but the Jana Sangh refused to accept the
Agreement* Some Jana Sangh members offered civil disobedience by entering
Kutch (some Madhya Pradesh Jana Sangh Ministers resigned to participate in
it) but they were arrested. Pakistan is anathema to the whole concept of the
Bharatiya rashtra of the Jana Sangh, and it will always find in it a fit tar-
get to attack.
The attitude to Pakistan is important because it carries over to the
Jana Sangh attitude towards those who are either friends or allies of
Pakistan, or have an outstanding difference of opinion with it. Thus the
party gives lip service to a Pukhtoonistan and urges the government of India
to aid the Pakhtoons in establishing a separate state. Thus Afghanistan
which is an Islamic state is not derided by the Jana Sangh.
India must extend all possible moral and diplomatic support to
her for the liberation of Pakhtoonistan. . .must also pay more atten-
tion to the revival of pre-Islamic cultural ties, be^een India and
Afghanistan. °0
Towards Israel and the Arab states, the Jana Sangh urges that India
adopt a policy of strict reciprocity. So far the United Arab Republic has
remained neutral between India and Pakistan, and claims to be a good friend
of Pakistan and the People's Republic of China, while retaining the friend-
ship of India. Therefore, it is possible for India too, to be a good friend
of Israel while retaining the friendship of the D.A.R.
Not surprisingly, the attitude of the Jana Sangh is hostile to Paki-
stan's allies—Turkey and Iran, in the Central Treaty Organization and
Regional Cooperation for Development.
Towards other nations, the Jana Sangh has varying attitudes. Towards
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Nepal, it takes a very brotherly stance, which is not overly appreciated by
the sensitive Nepalese. It sees Israel, Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines
as democratic nations with whom India should have the closest of relations.
The last three, together with Taiwan and South Korea are nations viewed as
potential allies against an expansionist China. Of course Pakistan is not
considered in such alliances. A number of Jana Sanghis have travelled to
these countries. The question of overseas Indians pervades the Jana Sangh
view toward Burma and Ceylon. It regularly assails Ceylon, Burma and
Malaysia among others for maltreating Indians. It was definitely opposed to
the Bandarnaike-Shastri agreement about the stateless Indians,'
China
Towards China, the attitude of the Jana Sangh has changed from broth-
erliness to animosity. The Jana Sangh argues that China and Pakistan are
both menaces comparing them to tuberculosis and the plague, respectively.
But though China is stronger, there is greater hope of obtaining V7estem aid
in fighting it.°*-
But in the beginning the Jana Sangh was a naive as the Congress Party.
In October 1951 t the Organiser welcomed the Chinese cultural delegation. The
paper said:
...Since the dawn of history Bharat and China have been friends
...We loved and respected each other. Today we reinforce those
ancient foundations of friendship. The Chinese Mission will expe-
rience an immense fund of good-will for China in this country. °3
Yet the party did not approve of the communistic method being tried by the
Chinese, The Chinese takeover in Tibet opened the eyes of many in India,
including the Jana Sangh, to the expansionism of Chinese communism. The
party stated its position in a resolution in December 1953
5
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In view of the fact that the Communist Government of China is
becoming increasingly more aggressive in the northern frontier of
India that it has overrun Tibet through her troops destroying her
age-old autonomy, that she ... is constructing military bases
within striking distance of Northern India . . . that she is
issuing maps containing many areas of Indian territory , . show-
ing them as her o\m territory, the Jana Sangh is of the opinion
that the Government of India should instruct her . . , representa-
tive in Peking to protest emphatically • . . and to declare cate-
gorically that the MacMahon Line existing between China and India
must stand intact . • ,9^''
Thus the Jana Sangh saw China as an ancient partner of India, one to
which India had exported its Buddhist religion, but now under communist rule
the cultural partner had become a country to be feared and guarded against.
By 1957 1 "the party was basically hostile to China, and China began to
play a greater role in the Manifesto as the Jana Sangh saw a potential enemy
to the north. The incursions of the Communist Chinese in Ladakh led some in
the party to place the dangers from China ahead of the dangers from Pakistan.
China too was threatening "erosion of the sacred soil." As these claims
matured into an actual occupation of territory in Ladakh, China assumed a
place along side Pakistan as the enemy of India.
In the inter-election period this feeling grew rapidly. The public
knowledge that China had occupied areas in Ladakh claimed by India sealed the
hostility of the party to China On March JO, 1959, the Jana Sangh demon-
strated in front of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, the first of a number
of demonstrations. The party accused Nehru of taking an equivocal stand on
the issue. Upadhyaya stated the Policy of the Jana Sangh:
...If our betrayal of the Tibetan people's cause and justifica-
tion of uncalled for aggression by communist China be the price for
Sino-Indian friendship, it is not worth that sacrifice.
. .An atmos-
phere conducive to mutual trust and goodwill can hardly exist when
the Chinese army is concentrated on our borders, especially when
China has already created serious suspicions in our minds , due to
mischievous cartography.
. .Those who demand a submissive attitude by
India, stand not for respectable relations between two equals but
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the ultimate enslavernont of India by the Communist world.,,°5
Tho first Jana Sangh session which took specific note of Chinese occu-
pation of Indian claimed territory, was that at Nagpur in January 1$60. In
his presidential address Pitamber Das said the Government "has failed com-
pletely to discharge its responsibility. "°° He added "for a tine it kept the
people and Parliament entirely ignorant of the fact of aggression. "97 The
resolution passed at the session said, "Communist China has created a crisis
by posing a challenge to the freedom of the countries of south and South East
Asia. "9" The party saw the "lull created in Europe" by the Soviet Union as
being utilized by China and saw this as evidence of a joint world communist
plan; "Russia has never condemned the Chinese efforts to disturb peace and
create an atmosphere of war."°9 ln discussing the Indian problems with China
the party saw China using both military means and fifth-column methods to
subject "Vietnam, Indonesia, and Laos" as well as India, and said the Chinese
must be faced jointly on all fronts. Eeside calling for the military expul-
sion of the Chinese the party asked: (1) the recognition of Tibetan inde-
pendence; (2) the withdrawal of Indian support for China's admission to the
United Nations; (3) a close watch on "pro-Chinese elements" in India; and
(4) increase in India's military capacity. While these demands have changed
in detail or have been more strongly emphasized they remain the basic posture
of the Jana Sangh toward Communist China. The visit of Chou En Lai to Delhi
in April i960, gave the Jana Sangh an opportunity to address a memorandum to
Nehru on the evil designs of the Chinese on India. ^°
Wrapped up with the party's opposition to China was its strong denun-
ciation of Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Kenon of whom Upadhyaya wrote:
"There is not merely a suspicion but a firm belief in the minds of most
G±
diplomats at the U.N. that he has communist leanings."-'-01 The late General
Secretary went on to say, "At a time when our northern borders are seriously
threatened by Communist China, Sri Krishna Menon's silence has confirmed the
people's belief in his leanings. "1°2 Menon's stand on Pakistan, however , was
occasionally appreciated when for instance, the delegate to the United
Nations set a record for marathon speech making.
The Commonwealth10^
Ever since the Jana Sangh was formed in October 1951 i it has opposed
India's association with the Commonwealth, mainly on account of the attitude
of Britain and some other Commonwealth countries with regard to the Kashmir
issue. Its opposition however was not so vehement as that of the CPI or the
PSP.
At the opening convention of the Party its President Dr. Syama Prasad
Hookerjee stated that India's continuance in the Commonwealth had to be reex-
amined with great care.
We frankly recognize that we have gained very little by continu-
ing to function within the Commonwealth. On the other hand in our
dealings with Pakistan we have been struck by a strange policy of
partiality towards that country observed by Great Britain ... the
party would insist on India getting out of the Commomrealth, if
Britain and other Commonwealth countries followed the present pol-
icy of always supporting Pakistan and opposing India in the U.S.
and elsewhere.
These views were reiterated in the Party's Election Manifesto (1952) and on
many other occasions. The party seemed to be less occupied with the Common-
wealth in later years.
At the time of the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in 195&, the
Jana Sangh did not join the fray with other opposition parties. U. N.
Trivedi the Party leader in the Lok Sabha did not support the demand for
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quitting the Commonwealth. Instead he pleaded that India should advise and
correct her friend Britain. And it was not impossible that Britain would
feel "the strength of our argument and retrace her steps." The Sues issue,
he said "cannot be a ground for our getting out of the Commonwealth."
The Jana Sangh in its 1957 Manifesto made no demand for India's with-
drawal from the Commonwealth. But still it was critical of the Commonwealth
link. In I960, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, General Secretary of the Party expres-
sed his doubts about the usefulness of the Commonwealth as a "medium of
international co-operation." "He wanted the Commonwealth to 'fashion a
future for itself'.
"
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The party's view on Commonwealth membership was clarified further in
an editorial in the party organ. It stated:
We should leave the Commonwealth because it is neither honour-
able nor even profitable for us to be there... For its economic
'aid' it is simply an investment on purely business lines... Cn the
military plane it is equally meaningless. It is no use getting some
military training in a country which is no more much of a military
power. On the cultural plane we have had so much of anglicism in
India that any diminution of it can do us nothing but good. . .With
the passing away of one who was endearingly described not the first
Prime Minister of Independent India, but the last Viceroy of Brit-
ish India the time for quitting the British Commonwealth is high
indeed. 106
In short the party had opposed Commonwealth membership on the ground
that it was neither honorable nor profitable. It had contended that Britain
had been partial to Pakistan to the detriment of India's interest and honor.
Because of its policy of strict reciprocity towards Pakistan, the Jana Sangh
cannot but condemn any attempt on the part of Britain or any country, in
favour of Pakistan. At times its opposition was not so effective as that of
the other opposition parties. In any case the party did not vigorously
oppose Commonwealth membership.
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The Unite_d_ States
Tho Jana Sangh view of the United States can be characterized both as
generally favorable and dependent upon American relations with Pakistan. The
bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan on arms supply to
India's neighbour cane in for sharp criticism which has continued with little
abatement. When Pakistan did not come directly to India's assistance in the
fall of 1962, when China attacked India, this was taken as "proof" that the
arms were not accepted by Pakistan to resist international communism but to
use against India, and of course, when in 19&5 t fighting took place between
India and Pakistan, the Jana Sangh had "proof" again that the intentions of
Pakistan were to use the arms against India.
The United States recognized the influence of Sarvarkar as early as
1946 s ' but the Jana Sangh had often suspected the U.S.A. in the case of
Kashmir, and missionary activity in India. American policy came in for sharp
criticism on the Goa issue. °° The Jana Sangh had long been agitating for
the evacuation of Goa by the Portuguese. Eventually in I96I, the Government
of India did take over Goa by Police action. But the American Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles was criticized when he recognized Goa as a province
of Portugal.
Nonetheless, the Jana Sangh expressed the view that the "oldest and
largest" democracies in the world must pull together. Madhok in his
Jullunder presidential address again expressed this view: "Mutual interests
of India and U.S.A. apart from their common attachment to the democratic way
of life point to closer relations between them in the days to come." After
the Chinese invasion of 19^2, the Jana Sangh moved towards a consideration of
regional and pro-Western alliances. Some attention has been paid to the
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problems of nuclear cover from either the Eastern or Western bloc. Many Jana
Sangh leaders are willing to defend the American involvement in Vietnam (in-
cluding the bombing in the North) , although not without some latent apprehen-
sion about wostern neo-imperialiam. °'
U.S.i->
.
R.
For the USSR the Jana Sangh showed no enthusiasm. It is strongly
anti-communist in its views, though it has welcomed support in some matters
(Goa). A Soviet journal has attacked the Jana Sangh as "a party of the land-
lords, big bourgeoisie and the Hindu Priests."110 It has implied that the
party is reactionary and capitalistic, and as propagating a racial superior-
ity of the Hindus over the Muslims, Christians and Sikhs.
Defens e
As mentioned before one important aspect of the Jana Sangh foreign
policy view is that based on defense. If the country must follow a policy of
noninvolvement, it must be able to supply its own defense needs. It supports
an increase in all three wings of the Indian Defense forces—the army, navy
and the airforce. It also believes in the "development of an independent
nuclear deterrent" and priority should be given to the development of defense
industries so as to make the country self-sufficient in regard to defense
equipment. The Jana Sangh would like to get assistance in this respect from
iUffi .quarter
111 to enable India to become a strong and self-reliant military
power at the earliest. The justification for expenditure in the defense
field is
We are convinced that this can be achieved without much harm to
economic development because much of the money spent on defense pro-
duction and in the form of salaries to the defense personnel, con-
tributes directly or indirectly to the economic development of the
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country. Much of the development in Punjab, particularly in the
agricultural field, is the result of the investment of funds coming
to the villages from the jawans serving in the anny,^-^
Therefore one object of foreign policy should be to draw such countries
nearer to India which can help her to develop her defense industries. The
Jana Sangh believes this is possible.
Jana Sangh-Swatantra Alliance and Foreign Policy
It is the foreign policy issues that largely prevent a Jana Sangh-
Swatantra alliance, which has often been speculated upon. In the early years
when the Swatantra Party was formed, around the early sixties, the hopes of
such an alliance were bright, but it is ten years since, and no permanent
agreement has thus far been reached. Both parties urge a more "realistic"11^
foreign policy view upon the Congress, but they differ about the salience of
issues to achieve India's self-interest. Briefly the Swatantra party's posi-
tion is that China is the greatest threat to Indian security, hence India
must seek a pro-West alliance to combat the Chinese threat. Since the ques-
tion of Pakistan and Kashmir stand in the way of friendly relations with the
U.S.A. , a settlement on Kashmir should be made and a detente of relations
with Pakistan would follow. The Swatantra supports the war in Vietnam as
being in the interest of Indian national security. Also, as it is obvious
from the preceding discussion, Swatantra is anti-U.S.S.R.
The Jana Sangh on the other hand sees China and Pakistan as equally
dangerous to Indian security, and sees in an alliance with the West the
threat of neo-colonialism. It does not see Kashmir as the outstanding prob-
lem between India and Pakistan. Therefore, since Western alliance is guarded
with suspicion, it advocates building up an indigenous military and atomic
capability. The Jana Sangh is also virulently anti-U.S.S.R. and has recently
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begun to support the Vietnam war.
The differences in the Swatantra and Jana Sangh policies were somewhat
modified by the Chinese invasion of 19^2, and the war with Pakistan in 19&5*
The Chinese threat made the Jana Sangh assume a more pro-regional alliance
stand and support the Vietnam war; the Swatantra after the Pakistani war
began to question the capacity of the U.S. to help India in such situations
and hence gave increased attention to the same idea which Jana Sangh had
advocated, that is, the idea of developing an indigenous military capability.
As a result of these events there has been a tendency towards convergence,
but not to the extent of obliterating all major differences between the two
parties. The Jana Sangh charges Swatantra with being "anti-national 1 and
guilty of "appeasement" vis-a-vis Pakistan. Swatantra counters charges that
"there is a constant assault on a peaceful atmosphere by politicians with
anti-Muslim bias to which they give name of Hindu culture."11-' Thus this
implicit communal accusation stands in the way of conciliation. For the Jana
Sangh to back out of the hostile Pakistan attitude, would as explained ear-
lier, alienate public opinion. This has become quite evident after the 19&5
war with Pakistan. Thus the stand that is crucially important to Jana Sangh
ideology hinders the party's affiliation with the Swatantra party.
The question whether there have been any conflicts within the party
itself concerning foreign policy issues is also an important consideration.
Two opposing views are not clearly visible within the party, however some
different shades of opinions at times emerge. One position voiced by Atal
Bihari Vajpayee advocates non-involvement in the affairs that do not directly
affect India, and can be seen as a "Gaullist" or a chauvinistic approach; the
other is the pro-west stand that Balraj Kadhok often supports. It is the
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latter that nay represent the less communal stand. On the other hand it has
been speculated that if the fight for power was ultimately between the Jana
Sangh and the Communist parties, the west (U.S.A.) would probably support the
Jana Sr.ngh with its Hindu ideal, communalism etc. , the precedent being sup-
port of the conservative regime of Spain headed by General Franco.""
In matters of foreign policy, the issues that are the most important
to Jana Sangh mass membership are Kashmir, and the vociferous anti-Pakistani
stand that the party takes. Since 19&2, the fear of China has also unleashed
feelings of patriotism and nationalism. Otherwise, party policy on other
issues (e.g. the Commonwealth, Defense, relations with U.S. or U.S.S.R.) are
not so important to the masses, because the people are less directly con-
fronted with them. Yet a need for caution has been voiced on the Jana
Sangh* s militant approach to foreign policy issues. It has been remarked that
if the Jana Sangh should internalise the feelings of hostility for other
countries, "the manipulative capacity of the government will be restricted
and flexibility in conduct of foreign policy will be greatly reduced". ^'
The reasons for emphasis on Pakistan and Kashmir are not far to seek: the
base of the party membership is concentrated in northern India which felt to
a greater degree the repurcussions of the partition of the country. The
question of Kashmir is closely allied to the same stream of thought and many
North Indians especially those who were involved in the mass migration of
19^7 t or had close family ties in the area and were victims of the arson,
slaughter etc., feel very strongly about it. In fact they were therefore
able to strongly identify with the Jana Sangh Hindu stand. It may be possi-
ble that the next generation, which was not directly involved in the issue
may not put such a strong emphasis on it. To them the question of China may
nassume greater importance, Jana Sangh policy may then be seen as maintaining
this hard line to avoid offending public opinion. The "hard line" is in con-
formity with the total nationalistic appeal of the Jana Sangh, on the basis of
which it draws a wider mass appeal than the Swatantra party. The emotional
appeal of the Jana Sangh has greater value because the Congress party advo-
cates the economic issues very strongly. Thus the main foreign policy issue
of a strong attitude towards Pakistan draws in a large measure to the Jana
Sangh its North Indian support, and vice versa, the large support then makes
the party maintain its hard line . At the same time it is this issue that
largely prevents the Jana Sangh-Swatantra "convergence" on foreign policy
matters
.
To sum up, the attitude of the Jana Sangh in foreign policy matters
can be characterized as "Gaullist." 1^" The basic instinct for the Jana Sangh
is to be chauvinistic and isolationalist, building Indian power and involving
India only where she is directly and immediately involved. Yet, the effect
of the Chinese aggression has been to persuade the party that India can not
stand alone. As a result more attention has been paid to regional defense.
The maturing of policy on Kashmir is a landmark that should not go unnoticed.
Characteristically, it was voiced by Balraj Madhok, who had spearheaded the
liberal movement in the Jana Sangh to make its ties with the RSS less binding.
CHAPTER V
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE
A general election jn India is a national "tairiaasha" , a source
of entertainment and diversion, an absorbing experience involving
in one way or another almost every adult, and many children as
veil. 119
Elections reflect the mood of the people. A general election is also
a major form of political participation by the masses of the people, who
otherwise are left out of it all. Elections are a recognized means of pro-
viding succession in leadership. The problem of political succession is com-
mon to all systems, even in a dictatorship. Elections can also control pol-
icy decisions of the government through devices such as initiative, referen-
dum and repeal. Policy decisions of the government may be influenced by the
elections. Furthermore, elections also serve to secure the legitimation of
a regime or to maintain the legitimacy that may have already been established.
The former, that is securing the legitimation of the regime is important
especially in developing countries, where universal suffrage has been
achieved without the struggle that western societies e.g. England had to
undergo. It is also posited that elections may help maintain legitimacy by
bringing together, in support of a single party, individuals who are other-
wise remote from or in conflict with each other on grounds of class, status
or religion. On the other hand, an election may be functionless if it has no
consequences for the political system. This could be possible in the case of
a country where elections are unfamiliar, communications poor and administra-
tion primitive. 20
Voting in an election can serve several functions for the individual.
It brings a certain awareness to the common man and is a channel through
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which he expresses his feelings. It involves his choice of governmental pol-
icies, political parties, and their representatives. It also brings to him a
feeling of poirer of being able to influence the choice of the election.
Voting is also seen as contributing to the "development or maintenance of an
individual's allegiance to the existing constitutional regime." 121 The indi-
vidual can also express his disaffection with the regime by voting for the
opposition or by not voting at all. On the other hand, voting can also be
functionless i.e. devoid of any emotional or politically significant personal
consequences. This can be the case when the electorate is largely illiter-
ate. 122
The above mentioned functional aspects of elections and voting are
significant in India. Elections in India can be a unifying force, for people
from other regions and speaking different languages can unite under one party
slogan. This has also led to a polarization of forces in a regional context
where regional loyalties have been increasingly mobilized. With each succes-
sive election the individual voter is learning the meaning of the power of
the ballot and "increasing number of participants are maneuvering for their
place in the system. "123 If in the early years after independence, people in
remote areas were not affected by the elections, at present the politicians
are so eager to woo them for their votes that they are becoming aware of
their right to exercise the ballot.
Elections can also provide an effective channel through which the
Opposition can make its voice heard and can effectively perform as a pressure
group, aggregating and articulating the interests of a certain section of the
community. The Jana Sangh is usually recognized, as the representative voice
of the interests of the Hindu majority. It has contested seats in all the
7^
four General Elections conducted in India and has obtained an increased num-
ber of seats in the Lok Sabha (Parliament) and Vidhan Sabhas (State Legisla-
tive Assemblies) and an increased percentage of the popular vote. The
increasing participation by the party in the political process has brought to
it a certain degree of flexibility, resulting in pragmatism. In the electoral
sphere, this has meant alliances with other political parties, maybe not of
the same political hue as the Jana Sangh, but political expediency has
prompted such action, when ideology may have specifically repudiated it.
In India, general elections to the Lok Sabha (House of People) are
held every five years. The Lok Sabha consists of a maximum of 500 members
directly elected by voters in the states for a term of 5 years on the basis
of adult franchise and territorial constituencies, plus not more than 20 mem-
bers from the Union territories to be either elected or appointed, as Parlia-
ment may decide. For the purpose of elections to the Lok Sabha, the states
are divided into single member constituencies which are more or less of the
same size in population. The adoption of population as the basis of allot-
ment of seats in Parliament creates certain political disparities among the
states and gives an obvious political advantage to the more populous ones.
The Rajya Sabha (House of States) consists of a maximum of 250 repre-
sentatives of the States, elected for a term of six years by the state legis-
latures. The President nominates 12 of these for their special knowledge or
practical experience in such matters as literature, sciences, art and social
service. The Rajya Sabha is a continous body and not subject to dissolution.
One third of the members retire every two years. The number of seats allo-
cated to each state in the Rajya Sabha is determined on the basis of relative
population, but the smaller states have been accorded source weightage in
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representation.
In the states, there exists a system of responsible parliamentary
government which resembles that of the central government; where there is a
bicameral legislature, the upper House is known as the Legislative Council
,
and is a permanent body which renevrs one third of its membership every two
years through a complicated system of indirect election. The Legislative
Assembly
, or lower house of each state is chosen by direct election from ter-
ritorial constituencies, unless dissolved earlier it serves for 5 years.
It is the function of the Election Commission to delimit the constitu-
encies for the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections. In the case of vacancy of
a seat due to death or resignation, a by-election for the seat is held; a
mid-term poll is the election of a new state government in case the previous
one has lost its majority and the House is dissolved by the Governor. When
examining election data for India, two important considerations must be kept
in mind. The reorganization of states often makes it difficult to compare
data from one election to the other, and statistical information about the
elections is not often identical in all sources, small discrepencies being
found often.
We shall now consider the performance of the Jana Sangh in the four
General elections held in India in 1952, 1957, 1962 and I967. Since the Lok
Sabha is the popularly elected House, greater attention will be paid to the
Lok Sabha elections and party behavior concerning these.
a . The First General Election - 1952
Selection of Candidates and Organization of the Campaign
It seems that the selection of candidates in 1952 was hasty. This is
seen by a comparison of the selection of candidates in 1952 and 1957« Of the
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683 candidates that the Jana Sangh ran in 1952, thirty were successful. In
1957 i only twelve of the thirty stood for re-election, and less than 8p of
the 1952 candidates were nominated. Disciplinary problems were responsible
for some measure of this—in Rajasthan, only three of the eight persons
elected in 1952 stood for re-election in 1957.
Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee was the principal campaigner and he addres-
sed people in many constituencies in and out of Bengal. The principal
speaker against the party was Nehru himself, who in the 1952 elections appar-
ently feared the nationalistic and reactionary right more than the socialist
and communist left. In a note to the Election Committee of the Congress, he
said that they should beware of any communal element in the Congress and
should choose their nominees vrith great care. - Mookerjee took care to
repudiate such statements and the charges flew back and forth. ^
Alliances
The attempt of the Jana Sangh to enroll a number of the smaller par-
ties under its label failed. Both the Orissa Jana Sangh and the Ganatantra
Parishad of the same state declined to join and fought the elections under
their own banner. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh did not contest in Orissa leaving
the door open for a later alliance of the Orissa parties with it. This hope
in the Ganatantra Parishad was unfounded. The talks with the Janata Party of
Chota Nagpur for alliance or merger also failed, and Raja Kamakhya Narain
Singh of Ramgarh ran his candidates without an alliance with any party. The
Jana Sangh did not oppose him due to a lack of candidates.
The natural allies of the Jana Sangh were the Hindu Mahasabha and the
Ram Rajya Parishad. It was easy for Mookerjee to cement an alliance xri.th the
Mahasabha in West Bengal with the Mahasabha leader, Chatterjee. The parties
11
decided to run their candidates under their own labels with support of the
other party. Elsewhere, the three parties were generally unsuccessful in
resolving their differences. In Delhi, the Jana Sangh and Mahasabha tried to
set up an alliance for the Civic elections, and failed even though the issue
1?6
was put to arbitration. In Uttar Pradesh, alliance was broken, at the
last minute, though the Jana Sangh was able to ally with the U.P. Praja Party.
Local agreements were made elsewhere in U.P. and Rajasthan. 2 '
Results
The results of the election were disappointing to the Jana Sangh
because it had expected to do better at the polls.
The Election Commission had set a level of 3% of the total popular
vote as the minimum to be polled by a party for it to be accorded recognition
as an "all India Party." The Jana Sangh managed to do this by a very narrow
margin; it polled 3«06;o of the Lok Sabha vote, and was thereby entitled to
have its election symbol the Deepak (lamp) reserved for the exclusive use of
its members. Four other parties obtained all India recognition—the Congress,
the Communist Party of India, the Socialist Party and the Kisan Nazdoor Praja
Party (the latter two later merged into the Praja Socialist Party, leaving
four national parties in the field.)
Three Jana Sanghis were elected to the Lok Sabha—among them Syama
Prasad Hooker jee. In the Assembly elections, Mookerjee's psrsonality and
following brought the Jana Sangh successes in Eengal which wore unrelated to
its organisational strength. In all, the Jana Sangh won 3^ Assembly seats
and 2.76/0 of the vote; eight seats were from Midnapur (W. Bengal), and there
it received 12.68,' of the vote.
In the Punjab, the party had the greatest disappointment. The party
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TABLE III
JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - 1952
Lok Sabha
Seats1 Cont. 2 Won3 LD^
State Legislative Assemblies
Seats Cont. Won LD $
42 - - - - Andhra Pradesh 241 - - - -
12 2 1 3.64 Assam 105 3 3 0.29
53 2 2 .42 Bihar 318 44 42 1.15
22 - - - - Gujarat 160 4 3 0.10
17 - - - - Kerala 129 - - - -
38 11 4 5.92 Madhya Pradesh 339 126 6 68 5.66
39 - - - - Madras 198 - - - -
42 4 2 2.01 Maharashtra 299 36 - 32 1.29
25 4 4 2.22 Mysore 212 25 21 1.21
20 - - - - Orissa 140 - - - -
23 12 11 4.99 Punjab 186 35 2 59 ^.07
22 4 1 2 3.67 Rajasthan 189 65 11 35 6.34
86 41 23 7.29 Uttar Pradesh 430 210 2 153 6.44
36 6 2 5.59 West Bengal
Union Territories
250 85 9 60 5.31
4 3 25.92 Delhi 48 30 4 4 21.88
4 2 1 10.72 Hiraachal Pradesh 36 9 8 3.46
2 - - - - Manipur - - - - -
2 2 2 6.14 Tripura — - - - -
489 93 3 52 3.06 TOTAL 3283 722 34 438 2.76
Note: The Fraja Parishad did not contest the Election in Kashmir.
1, Seats: Total numbe r of seats.
2. Cont.: Number of seats contested.
3 . Won Number of seats won.
4. LD : Lost Deposit. Number of candidates 1•rtio lost their deposit because
they failed to obtain 1/6 of the vote •
«; 4,j» p : Refers to the per centage of the vote obtained in the Lok 3.ibha and
Legislative Assemblies respectively.
Adapted to states as in 1958.
Sources: Craig Baxter, "Jana Sangh: A Brief History" in South_A s ian Politi cs
and Religion
,
(Princeton, I966).
from Election Commission of India, Report of the Firs t General Elec-
tions in India 1951-52, Vol. II, New Delhi, not dated.
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was founded here and expected to achieve major success. Of the 35 seats con-
tested, two were obtained in the election, and 59 contestants lost their
deposits, (i.e., obtained less than l/6 of vote.) It seems that the Jana
Sangh and the Akali Dal cancelled each other out.
In Delhi, the Jana Sangh showed signs of strength, three out of four
contestants retained their deposits. This initial start would later lead to
a near polarization between the Congress party and Jana Sangh in 19&2, and by
I967, the Jana Sangh would be in control of the Delhi i-Iunicipal Corporation.
In Rajasthan, the Jana Sangh won eleven of the seats and in Kadhya
Bharat four. Elsewhere in Central India the Jana Sangh won two assembly
seats in Vindhya Pradesh. In Hadhya Pradesh, as then constituted, the party
failed to win any seats, but it began the foundations of an organization
which would win seats in the future in the Hindi-speaking Hahakoshal area.
In the vast expanse of Uttar Pradesh the Jana Sangh won but two assembly
seats, one in Gonda District and the other in Badaun. In the other states.
the party made but a token show. A few candidates managed to retain their
deposits. In Mysore, a bare beginning was made in the south. No seats were
won, but about 2p of the votes were obtained in the State.
Appraisal
Balraj Madhok writing after the election said:
Viewed in the light of the serious handicaps under which the Jana
Sangh contested the elections, it was a remarkable achievement.
Being the youngest party it hardly had any time to make itself known
to the people.
. .Lack of political and electoral experience in its
workers, who were mostly young men, and paucity of resources badly
handicapped it. But, perhaps, the greatest factor against it was
the concentrated and systematic attack on it by Pt. Nehru whose
virulent denunciations of Jana Sangh were echoed by almost the
entire press and all the leftist parties in the country... ^
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The editor of the Organizer said it. this wayi
A major factor in Jana Sangh' s election fight was the inexperi-
ence of its workers...
In the case of Jana Sangh, if the candidates were poor financially,
the organization was even poorer in that respect.
...taken as a whole they (the Muslims) voted mostly for the Con-
gress... The matter assumed a certain decisiveness by virtue of the
fact that Muslins were concentrated in the North where the hope of
the Jana Sangh particularly lay.
Another serious difficulty was the absence of supporting sectional
organization. . .It did not have a women's organization. . .Also there
was no Jana Sangh organization on the Harijan front...And above all
the Jana Sangh lacked a Labour Front... 2 '
The major problems of the party were thus outlined. Organizational
support was obtained by the formation of womens' groups, students and labour
groups. Details were given in Chapter III.
The RSS chief, Golwalkar gave the Jana Sangh a "well done" and said
the party should not be pessimistic and "should go ahead with calm confidence
in themselves and their mission. "130
The historian of the Mahasabha said "at many places the Hindu Kaha-
sabha lost seats by a few votes... on account of the opposition of Jana
Sangh. "131 Prakash's complaint assumes that had one party withdrawn its can-
didate in favor of the candidate of the other party, all votes secured by the
withdrawing candidate would have been polled by the candidate remaining in
the contest. Besides, that the total vote combined would have secured the
candidate success at the poll is also an assumption.
The elections of 1951~52 are now history. The party had made a rea-
sonable showing, was recognized as a national party and had its nationally
known leader to carry on both in Parliament and in the organization. It also
had the substantial backing of the RSS and it had drawn in a number of non-
RSS people. The party saw its shortcoming and was prepared to use the
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ensuing five years to build itself into a stronger force before the next
general election.
In the results of the first election some of the trends of the future
of the Jana Sangh are visible. The failure of the attempted alliance between
the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jana Sangh had important portents. No one organ-
ization wanted to be submerged under the other, and the Jana Sanghis tended
to look down upon the older Mahasabhaites as having seen their day. They
considered the Jana Sangh a youthful and vital organization and did not want
to associate it with an organization that had been branded "communal" . Since
then the Jana Sangh has tried to repudiate the communal label that is often
attributed to it, and has never contracted an effective alliance with the
other Hindu communal parties, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad.
The success of the Jana Sangh accrued mainly from the North Indian
region. This is a reflection of its membership base, and the appeal of its
ideology. This is going to be the region which the Jana Sangh will draw its
most substantial support. Its success in West Bengal was a reflection not cf
the party but of the personality of Syama Prasad Hookerjee, because after his
death the Jana Sangh has not even had the meagre success it did in the first
election. In the Southern parts of the country, the only state where the
Jana Sangh obtained some support was Mysore. Though no study of this aspect
has been made, it can be speculated that this support for the Jana Sangh came
from the Mysore Brahman caste, which can identify with the Hindu feeling of
the Jana Sangh.
Inter-ele ction Period
The Jana Sangh
had a clear indication of its areas of strength and weakness. It
S2
set itself now to the task of grovrth and consolidation based on
Hookerjee as a parliamentary and national leader, and the RSS as the
spearhead of local organization. The Jana Sangh would also attempt
to bring the Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad into its
fold.^Z
Hooker jee* s first step was the formation of the National Democratic
Party, (NDP) consisting of the opposition forces in Parliament, and included
members drawn from the Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Ganatantra Parishad,
Akali Dal, Commonwealth Party, Tamilnad Toilers Party and nine independents
from South India. Mookerjee had hoped to unite the conservative elements of
the opposition. Today, had the alliance been secure, the results would have
been "incalculable," It would have included South Indian parties (the Jana
Sangh does find itself restricted to the northern Hindi heartland) and the
Akalis, But, the NDP was not adequately consolidated, and with the death of
Hookerjee in 1953 » its existence was also short lived. For the Jana Sangh,
and the opposition as a whole, this was an irreparable loss.
At its annual session in Kapur, U.P. , in December 1952, Hooker jee had
been re-elected President and Deen Dayal Upadhaya was appointed General Sec-
retary, a post he held till 19o7» when he became President of the Jana Sangh.
The Praja Parishad of Kashmir sent its representatives to the session, and
the Parishad's affiliation to the Jana Sangh was recognized. -^33 Soon Mooker-
jee would offer satyagraha (passive resistance) in Kashmir to protest the
acceptance of the special status of Kashmir in the Indian Union under the
Nehru-Abdullah Pact.i3^ But while doing so, he was arrested and died while
under the custody of the Government of Kashmir.
However, as mentioned earlier, the NDP collapsed and soon the merger
talks between the Jana Sangh and Mahasabha, which were under progress, in
Hookerjee' s life time failed now, with considerable bitterness on both sides.
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Each side did not want to bo absorbed into the other. Moreover, the Jana
Sangh seemed too liberal for the I-lahasabha leaders. The charisma of 1'ooker-
jee was lacking to patch up any sort of merger. Ever since then, though the
Jana Sangh has absorbed members from the Mahasabha, an alliejice has not been
successful.-^
The Sharma incident also shoved an important facet of the Jana Sangh
organization. On Hookerjee's death, Sharma, one of the General Secretaries
of the party succeeded him as President. But he clashed with the RSS domi-
nated wing of the party, and went to the press with his grievances, Shar.v.a
alleged "domination and interferences by the RS3" and "a vigorous and calcu-
lated drive on its part to turn the Sangh (Jana) into a convenient handle." 13°
He resigned, and his successor issued a strong statement which condemned
Sharma 's action, and his indictment of the party. Since then it has been
said, /
the Jana Sangh organisation came almost completely under the con-
trol of persons associated with the RSS. Since Sharma' s exit, fac-
tionalism, a factor in other Indian Political Parties has been all
but non-existent in the Jana Sangh. 37
But, since then, a similar kind of feud seemed to have developed
between the late Deen Dayal Upadhaya, and Balraj Madhok, who represent the
organizational and flexible sections of the party. 13° Since the death of
Upadhaya early in I968 , Atal Bihari Vajpayee has more or less represented his
cause. But it is essential to emphasize that the kind of factionalism that
is present in other parties is absent in the Jana Sangh and they usually have
less disciplinary problems to encounter,
b. The Second General Election - 1957
Selection of Candidates and Organization of the Campaign
84
It appears that the Jana Sangh was much more careful in the selection
of its candidates than it was in 1952. For Legislative Assemblies the Jana
Sangh ran 722 candidates in 1952. Only 47 of these vrere candidates again in
1957i and eight others transferred from Assembly to Lok Sabha seats. Of the
34 Assembly seat winners, in 1952 only 14 were renominated and only one of
the three Lok Sabha winners was renominated. The results showed that care in
the selection of candidates was profitable to the party.
The Jana Sangh relied on its few better known speakers to some extent,
but mainly turned to the local workers.
The election campaign received guarded support from Golwalkar himself.
In an article in the Organizer , he said:
I belong to no political party and no political party has any
special claims on me. I do not, therefore, advocate the cause of
any particular person or party. But as a Hindu... I make bold to
express my personal views and to make a few suggestions...
I address myself to the great Hindu people... I pray to them to
rouse themselves in their self-consciousness and freely and boldly
exercise their right of vote without being misled, without being
distracted or frightened into upholding any individual or party.
Let them be alert and discriminate, and resolutely vote for men and
parties dedicated to the Hindu people and the Hindu Cause. 39
The party was once again branded communal. Nehru particularly worked
hard to keep the Jana Sangh down. The Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the
Communist Party of India (CPI) also bore down hard on the Jana Sangh, except
of course in Maharashtra and Gujarat where the parties were allied.
Alliances
Upadhaya declared the basic policy of the Jana Sangh to be opposed to
national alliances with any party. He said the party would agree to local
adjustments with all parties except the Communists and communal parties:
Akali Dal, Muslim League, Dravida Kunnetra Kazhagam (DMK). 1^
85
In the Punjab, the Congress and Akali Dal came to an election agree-
ment under which Master Tara Singh's party agreed to run its candidates under
the Congress lable. Organizer published a report that the Congress invited
the Jana Sangh to come under its fold,-'-' 1'-*- but the report has net been con-
firmed elsewhere.
As in 1952, in 1957 also, the Hindu parties were unable to come
together. They did agree to a partial alliance in West Eengal, but the three
parties there were so weak, that it did not matter. With the Mahasabha alone
the Jana Sangh wanted to discuss "concrete steps'' 1^ qX a working committee
meeting in Poona. The negotiations broke down in a series of recriminations
of which this, by Upadhaya is typical:
The Hindu Mahasabha seems to be following a suicidal policy while
setting up candidates for the ensuing elections. Instead of concen-
trating their energies in those areas where the Mahasabha won some
seats and where the people know its name, its leaders are trying to
fritter away its meagre resources in setting up candidates in those
areas where no Hindu Sabha committee exists, and where they are sure
to lose their deposits. They are envious of Bharatiya Jana Sangh,
and desire to finish its all-India recognition, . .Unless the Hindu
Sabha leaders intend to act as tools of the Congress, there is no
reason why Bharatiya Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha cannot come to
some adjustment...-*-^
In the controversy of dividing the bilingual Bombay state, the Jana
Sangh supported the complementary demands of a unilingual state in Maharashtra
and a unilingual state in Gujarat. The Jana Sangh joined the Samyukta Maha-
rashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra Committee) which included the Socialist
Party, the Peasants and Workers Party and the CPI and P3P, This paid off
later in terms of winning seats; in Maharashtra the Jana Sangh had a well
disciplined cadre of workers to offer. The Mahagujarat Janata Parishad was
less well put together and the Jana Sangh participation in it had less to
offer to the Jana Sangh and vice versa.
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Results
The Jana Sangh made considerable gains over 1952. It increased its
Lok Sabha representation only slightly from three to four seats, but increased
its share of the poll from 3,06% to 5«93$» In the contests for state assem-
blies the party won 46 seats as compared to 34 in 1952. This time all the 46
remained with the party at least until the assembly opened while in 1952,
four deserted as soon as the votes were counted. In assembly elections the
party polled 4.03$ of the vote as compared with 2.76$ in 1952.
With two Lok Sabha seats and 17 assembly seats, Uttar Pradesh became
the leading state in terms of Jana Sangh representation. In Lok Sabha con-
tests in Uttar Pradesh, the party raised its share of the poll from 7*29$ to
14.79$. In the assembly poll in the state, the Jana Sangh raised its vote
from 6.4^ to 9.8*$.
In the Madhya Pradesh Lok Sabha poll the Jana Sangh contested 21 of
the 36 seats, lost deposits on 6, and won no seats. In the assembly seats,
the Jana Sangh contested 127 of the 288 seats, won ten, and 64 candidates
lost deposits. The party won 9.89$ of the vote.
In Rajasthan, the party contested only seven of the 22 Lok Sabha seats,
winning none, but losing no deposits, while polling 11,10$ of the vote. For
the assembly, the Jana Sangh contested only 47 of the I76 seats winning six,
losing 26 deposits and polling 5*52$ of the vote, a decline in both seats won
and percentage of votes in 1952.
Punjab was both a failure and an improvement to the party. Again it
failed to do well in Lok Sabha contests, but, drawing on the urban Hindu vote,
it won nine seats in the assembly. The party contested 16 of the 22 Lok Sabha
seats and gained 16.04$ of the vote. With the exception of Delhi this was the
8?
TABTJ3 IV
JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - 1957
Lok Sabha State Legislative Assemblies
Seats Cont, Won LD % Seats Cont. Won LD *
43 1 1 0.04 Andhra Pradssh 301 8 8 .11
12 - - - Assam 108 - - - -
53 2 2 0.08 Bihar 318 29 22 1.10
22 - - - Gujarat* 133 5 1 0.55
18 - - _ Kerala 126 - - -
36 21 6 13.96 Madhya Pradesh 238 127 10 64 9.89
41 - - - Madras 205 - - - -
44 7 2 1 4.73 Maharashtra* 263 18 4 7 2.00
26 5 4 2.48 Mysore 208 20 14 1.37
20 - - - Orissa 140 - - - -
22 16 6 16.04 Punjab 154 65 9 31 8.60
22 7 11.10 Rajasthan 176 47 6 26 5.52
86 61 2 30 14.79 Uttar Pradesh 430 235 17 131 9.84
36 5 3 1.43 West Bengal
Union Territories
252 33 30 0.98
5 5 2 19.72 Delhi • _. — _ _
4 - - - Himachal Pradesh - - - - -
2 - - - Manipur - - - - -
2 — — — — Tripura - - - — —
494 130 4 53 5.93 TOTAL 3102 587 46 334 4.03
Gujarat and Maharashtra as they are constituted at present.
Sources: Election Commission of India, Report on the Second General Election in
India
, 1957, Vol. II, New Delhi, 1953.
Craig Baxter, "Jana Sangh: A Brief History" in South Asian P olitics
and Religion, ed. Donald E. Smith, (Princaton, I966).
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highest percentage polled in any state by the Jana Sangh.
With the abolition of the Delhi Legislative Assembly, elections were
held only for the five Lok Sabha seats. The Jana Sangh contested all five,
won none and lost two deposits while polling 19.72Jo of the vote. Madhok
finished a distant second to Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, who was now the Congress
candidate
.
Maharashtra presented a special case. The Jana Sangh won two of the
seven Lok Sabha seats it contested and four of 18 assembly seats. In the
area covered by the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti the party won two of the three
Lok Sabha seats and four of six assembly seats and it lost no deposit in this
area. The victories for the Jana Sangh were almost solely attributable to
the alliance on the unilingual state issue.
In West Bengal the rout of the Jana Sangh was all but complete. The
sitting Lok Sabha member did not contest for re-election and only three of
the nine elected to the assembly in 1952 stood again. All were defeated,
although each retained his deposit. The vote polled for assembly constituen-
cies dropped to O.98;o and for Lok Sabha seats to 1.^3$*
Elsewhere the party showed little strength. Seats were contested for
the Lok Sabha in Mysore (5), Bihar (2), and Andhra Pradesh (l), but with the
exception of the candidate in Belgaum, Mysore, all lost their deposits.
Assembly seats were contested in these states as well as in Gujarat but only
in Rajkot District of Gujarat and South Kanara District of Mysore did the
party poll mere than 5$ of the vote.
Appraisal
Malkani, editor of the Organizer assessing the early returns from the
election wrote; "The Jana Sangh progress is real but hardly spectacular."1
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The resolution of the working committee said;
• . .The Committee feels that the Jana Sangh in spite of the odds
against it has registered a definite advance both in respect of
votes polled and seats won...
In respect of state assemblies the election results in U.P.
,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab and Bombay have been quite
encouraging. .
.
Jana Sangh however, has got a set-back in West Bengal—here it
has not been able to maintain the position it had secured in the
last elections—as also in Bihar and Karnatak. . .Lack of solid organ-
izational base and lack of resources were found to be the main fac-
tor responsible . .
.
The Committee feels deeply concerned over the important part
played by caste ism and communalism, particularly Muslim communal-
ism. -^5
The question of alliances with the Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya
Parishad again occupied the attention of the Jana Sangh leaders, though not
to the extent it had following the 1952 elections. Steps wsre taken to
attempt a union of the Jana Sangh and the Parishad in Rajasthan after the
elections under which the two parties would operate as a single assembly bloc.
The number of contests between the three Hindu parties was greatly
reduced from the number in 1952, although the Jana Sangh and the Ram Rajya
Parishad still contested against each other in ^7 assembly constituencies in
the states in which both parties were recognized.
The party had obtained its largest measure of support from the state
of U.P. and this has continued ever since. It made an important showing in
M.P. too. Its success in Maharashtra was temporary, being based on one issue,
the formation of the unilingual state of Maharashtra, while in West Bengal it
was nearly out. In Rajasthan support for the Jana Sangh ideology met heavy
competition from the most conservative of Hindu parties the Ram Rajya
Parishad. Although the Jana Sangh does obtain a fair representation in the
state, its opposition has met with greater challenge here.
Thus the party had now faced its second electoral challenge. It had
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increased its seats slightly in Parliament and markedly in the states, espe-
cially when allowance is made for the abolition of the Delhi and Ajmer assem-
blies. Beyond seats, the party had developed a good base from which to
expand in some of the states, most notably Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.
It was now ready to refine and develop further in the period between the 1957
and I962 elections.
Inter-election Period
Atal Bihari Vajpayee was to become the star performer in the Lok Sabha.
He became leader of the parliamentary party of four in 1957 and, although he
was defeated for re-election in 1962, he has retained his position by being
elected to the Rajya Sabha.
The Jana Sangh was involved in two key by-elections to the Lok Sabha.
The first of these was Gurgaon, in the Punjab. The seat was won by Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, the Education Minister in 1957 and became vacant by his
death. The largest single group in the constituency is the Muslims and they
had voted en bloc for Azad against a Jana Sangh candidate in 1957* In the
by-election, the Congress gave its ticket to Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma
formerly president of the Jana Sangh, The Jana Sangh relished the opportunity
to oppose its former president. The second largest group in the Gurgaon con-
stituency was the Arya Samajists. Prakash Vir, an Arya Samajist entered the
contest, and was supported by the Jana Sangh. The highly organized Arya
Samaj bodies also supported him. It seems likely he also drew support to
some extent from the Muslims who were not pleased with having the Congress
nominate a non-Muslim. Prakash Vir won, obtaining 6l?o of the votes. While
not exactly a victory for the Jana Sangh, the support given by the party was
known, and largely credited for Vir's victory. ^°
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The second key election came in April 19&1, in the prestigious New
Delhi constituency. The seat had been won in 1952 and 1957 by Mrs. Sucheta
Kripalani of the Congress Party. In 19^0, she resigned from the Lok Sabha to
accept a place in the newly formed ministry in U.P. In the by-election the
Jana Sangh again nominated Balraj I-Iadhok who had lost to Mrs. Kripalani in
1957* There was a Congress candidate, and also, one from the Swatantra.
Balraj Madhok won by a margin of about 10,000 votes over the Congress candi-
date, The Swatantra candidate lost her deposit. The result was a morale
builder for the Jana Sangh. It was a signal to the Delhi Congress that it
faced a very strong challenge from the Jana Sangh, And, it was a humiliating
defeat for the Swatantra. It also served as a lesson for the conservative
parties that they were more likely to hurt each other than the Congress if
one tried to expand into areas in which the other was already present and
strong. 1^7
In the other states, e.g. U.P. the Jana Sangh trailed both the Praja
Socialist Party among the opposition groups, but it extended its membership
in the Legislative Council. In Rajasthan, the Jana Sangh was second to the
Ram Rajya Parishad among the opposition parties. The general lack of cohe-
sion in the Ram Rajya Parishad gave the small Jana Sangh group in the assem-
bly an influence out of proportion to its numbers. In I-ladhya Pradesh, the
Jana Sangh placed just behind the twelve of the PSP in M.P. ; and in the Pun-
jab, it was the largest opposition party.
In Maharashtra, the Jana Sangh formally broke with the Samuykta Maha-
rashtra Samiti in February 195^. From now on th3 Jana Sangh would go to it
alone. In 19&0, the party added two more seats in the Council from the Poona
and the Greater Bombay Teacher seats, where many of the voters are Brahmans.
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In Maharashtra, the appeal of the party has been to tho educated Hindu so too
in Andhra Pradesh and Mysore. A. Ramo Rao was elected from Andhra Pradesh,
and later became the only South Indian president of the party. There were
certain organizational changes that were made in 1958. The post of the zcnal
secretary was created to coordinate the work of the General Secretary of the
Jana Sangh. This addition to the organization was discussed in Chapter III,
Membership in civic bodies was another area in which the Jana Sangh
emphasized in its participation in the political process. In October 195?
i
elections were held to municipal bodies in Uttar Pradesh. The elections
included the corporations of the five major cities: Kanpur, Agra, Benares,
Allahabad and Lucknow. In contests for 10'+ municipalities the Congress won
absolute majorities in 29 , the Jana Sangh in two. Of the 2222 seats the Con-
gress won 856 and the Jana Sangh took 187 for second place among the organ-
ized parties. 1^" It was a strong showing for the Jana Sangh in the urban
areas.
In 1958, the municipal corporation of Delhi was elected. The result
was a crushing setback for the Congress which lost its majority in the cor-
poration. Of the 80 elective seats, the Congress took 31 and the Jana Sangh
25. (Communist 8, Mahasabha 1, Praja Socialist 1, and 1^ Independents.) 1 °
The Delhi corporation elections also resulted in the loss of Congress
control of the electoral college which is called upon to elect a Delhi member
of the Rajya Sabha. The Congress nominated the president of the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Hind ; the opposition supported Mirza Ahmad Ali. Ahmad Ali won, mov-
ing Organizer to editorialize:
This election has made it clear that the Congress is very much on
the way out in Delhi. Also that it is thriving only on the divided
vote of the opposition. In supporting Mirza the Jana Sangh taught
Congress quite a few lessons. One of these is that, contrary to
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Congress propaganda, it has no animus against Muslim priestly class.
And thirdly, it has reminded the Congress that it cannot overlook
the place of the Jana Sangh in the political life of the Capital. 5®
The coalition of the opposition however did not hold together and a Congress
candidate v.'as elected to the Rajya Sabha in i960.
The Punjab civic elections gave another indication of Jana Sangh vot-
ing power in the urban areas of northern India. In March, 1959 1 ^3 urban
areas went to the polls to elect members of the municipal boards. The Punjab
Jana Sangh won 66 of the 392 seats with an additional ^9 Jana Sanghis having
been elected as independents. This total of 115 was in excess of the number
of Congressmen returnees. Sharma claimed outright Jana Sangh majorities in
five towns, including Karnal, Rohtak and the industrial town of Eallabhgarh. 1^1
Previously the Congress had controlled ^-0 or k 1} towns.
The most important to the Jana Sangh of the series of civic elections
held between the two general elections were the October 1959 elections in the
five large cities of Uttar Pradesh. The Jana Sangh made an all out effort to
gain successes in the elections. It issued a manifesto which called for
increased efficiency, including incentive awards for outstanding municipal
workers, mobile clinics to provide free medical treatment, abolition of beg-
gary, abolition of the cycle tax, banning of obscene posters, opening of pri-
mary schools to provide education for all and the adoption of Hindi at all
levels of administration. In kicking off the campaign in Lucknow, Upadhyaya
condemned the Congress and the PSP for having concluded an electoral alliance
with the Muslim League in Kerala. "The nationalist democratic forces should
consolidate their ranks by supporting the Jana Sangh, "^52 said Upadhyaya.
When the results were in they showed that the Jana Sangh had moved from
fourth place into second behind the Congress. The Congress won none of the
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cities outright, although it was tho largest party in four cities. In Lucknow
the Jana Sangh was the largest party.
TABLE V
UTTAR PRADESH MAJOR CITY CIVIC ELECTIONS - 1959
City Seats Congress JS PSP SP CPI
Independ-
ent
Agra 54 16 7 1 - — 30
Allahabad 5^ 18 5 10 2 — 19
Banaras 54 17 14 — - 6 17
Kanpur 72 33 4 3 3 3 26
Lucknow 63 13 26 6 - 2 16
Total 279 97 56 20 5 11 103
Source: Or ganizer, XIII: 12 (November 9, 1959.)
The Jana Sangh was understandably pleased with the results in Uttar Pradesh.
The party paper quoted press comments which supported its contention that the
Congress was slipping in Uttar Pradesh while the Jana Sangh was rising.
-
L
"
Jana Sanghi Raj Kumar Srivastava was elected mayor of Lucknow. The Congress
elected mayors of the other four cities. In succeeding years the Jana Sangh
retained control of the office of the Lucknow mayor as G, D. Rastogi and
Dr. P. D. Kapoor followed Srivastava in the office.
The urban vote has been the strength of the Jana Sangh. In the next
elections the Jana Sangh demonstrated awareness of this, and worked to obtain
the rural vote.
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c « The Third General Election - 1962
Se
l
eetipn of Candidates and Organization of the Campaign
In selecting candidates for the I962 elections, the Jana Sangh had a
much higher renomination rate than it had shown in 1957t as compared with
1952. The party nominated primarily from among persons experienced in the
organization, but there were some notable exceptions. Dr. Raghuvira1^ who
had recently joined the party contested from Benaras. With a few exceptions,
the Jana Sanghis elected to the legislatures in 1957 and remaining with the
party were renominated in I962. Of the eight members of Parliament, seven
including the sole Rajya Sabha member were nominated for Lok Sabha seats.
Thirty of 46 members of the Legislative Assemblies elected in 1957
were renominated i.e., 65$. In addition to renomination of sitting members,
a much larger number of candidates who lost in 1957 were given another oppor-
tunity in 1962, than was true in 1957 over 1952. The Jana Sangh was trying
to build up a core of experienced campaigners
,
yet it was also not unwilling
to drop a 1957 candidate when he did poorly, or more important, when he had
failed to nurse his constituency in the inter-election period. The tradition
of RSS discipline led candidates to accept the decision almost invariably
without public complaint.
The Jana Sangh ran more candidates both for Lok Sabha seats and for
assembly seats throughout India than any party except the Congress itself.
In no state, except Delhi, did the party contest all Lok Sabha seats but it
did contest a majority of the seats in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and
Punjab and half the seats in Rajasthan. No Lok Sabha seats were contested in
either Orissa or Assam.
In the assemblies the Jana Sangh contested 377 of ^30 seats in Uttar
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Pradesh and 195 of 288 in Madhya Pradesh. The only other states in which more
than half were contested were Punjab and Rajasthan but the numbers were only
marginally above half. The party did put up candidates in each state holding
assembly elections. On the other side of the coin the Jana Sangh candidates
lost more deposits than those of any other party.
Tactics
The presence of the deepak symbol throughout India on the ballot
papers came at the end of the campaign during which the party used its many
candidates to publicise its program. The saturation technique could not fail
to bring the Jana Sangh to the notice of the voters of kOp of the assembly
constituencies and a slightly higher percentage of the Lok Sabha Constituen-
cies. The frequent attacks against the communal Jana Sangh by the Congress,
especially Nehru and Indira Gandhi gave the party some free mass publicity.
The Jana Sangh, as usual, both made a statement that no electoral
alliances would be contracted with other political parties, and went about
attempting to make local adjustments with several parties. Talks were held
with the other Hindu parties—Ram Rajya Parishad, Hindu Mahasabha and also
with the Swatantra Party. The results were few.
The Jana Sangh, the PSP and the Swatantra Party joined hands in a con-
test which was billed as one of the titanic struggles of the election. This
was the campaign of Acharya Kripalani as the independent nominee supported by
the three parties against Congress-nominee Krishna Menon in North Bombay. -55
Kripalani was defeated, but the Jana Sanghis who worked for him no doubt prof-
ited by their association with the campaign of a distinguished former Con-
gress party member and with other groups working for Kripalani. In the pub-
lic eye, the name of the Jana Sangh would be associated with Kripalani; by
c
v
working with other parlies, ground work may have been laid for the future.
Results
The Jana Sangh was pleased with the results of the 1$6Z elections.
This does not mean that there were not some considerable disappointments in
certain states and in many key election contests. The party however did
increase its membership in the Lok Sabha to 14 from the four elected in 1957
and the seven sitting just before the elections. In State assemblies Jana
Sangh now filled 116 seats as compared with but 46 elected in 1957* The
increase in popular vote was moderate: from 5»9$ to 6,44$ in the Lok Sabha
and 4.03/3 to 6.0?^ in the assemblies. The party made a gain in the percent-
age of the poll received in assembly voting in each state contested, except
West Bengal, and also in Lok Sabha voting the poll increased except in
Maharashtra, West Bengal, Punjab and Rajasthan.
In the Lok Sabha the major disappointments came when all sitting mem-
bers were eliminated from the House, the contesting six being defeated in the
elections. On the other hand the Jana Sangh achieved the status of "official
opposition" i.e., the largest opposition party having at least ten percent of
the seats in both Uttar Pradesh and Kadhya Pradesh. For the first time the
party entered the assembly in Bihar; and for the first time it contested
seats in Kerala. The seats gained in 1957 in Maharashtra as a result of the
Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti alliance were lost in I962.
Uttar Pradesh continued to be the key state for the Jana Sangh. The
Lok Sabha membership increased from two to seven and the assembly strength
from 17 to 49. Vajpayee contested two Lok Sabha seats. He was beaten in
Balrampur, U.P., the seat from which he was elected in 1957 by less than one
percent of the total vote, by Subhadra Joshi of the Congress. He was also
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defeated in the Lucknow seat. The reason for this was that both he and Balraj
Madhok, who was also defeated, spent excessive time campaigning for the party
outside their respective constituencies. Raghuvira was defeated in Benares.
In all, the Jana Sangh contested 7^ of the 86 seats, won seven and lost 33
deposits while polling 17.5?^ of the vote.
One of the assembly elections designated by observers as "key" was the
contest in Jaunpur between Jana Sangh assembly leader and incumbent Yadhuven-
dra Dutta Dubey, Raja of Jaunpur, and the state Home Minister, Hargovind
Singh. The result was a substantial win for the Raja. Among the newly
elected members was Mrs. Shauntala Nayar, the only Jana Sangh woman ever to
have been elected to office.
Madhya Pradesh also saw created a Jana Sangh official opposition in
the assembly and sent three Jana Sanghis to the Lok Sabha. In this state,
the Jana Sangh received a higher percentage of the vote, 17,8?vj, than in any
other state. The party contested 28 of the 3° seats, winning three and los-
ing 13 deposits. In another prestige contest a Jana Sanghi, Laxminarayan
Pandey, defeated Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Kailash Nath Katju, by a small
margin. In the previous election the fortunes had been in the reverse.
Rajasthan saw substantial gains by the Jana Sangh in the election for
the assembly; the number of seats won increased from 6 to 15, as compared to
1957 and the percentage of the vote rose from ^A?Jp to 9»15.^» The party also
won a Lok Sabha seat, although its share of the poll for the Lok Sabha
decreased as four of the eleven candidates lost their deposits while none of
the seven contesting in 1957 had done so. The southeastern reaches of the
state were the strongest areas of the party.
In the Punjab, the Jana Sangh won three Lok Sabha seats where none had
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TABLE VI
JAM SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - I962
Lok Sabha State Legisls.tive Asse™blies
Seats Cont. Won LD i Seats Cont. Won LD
SI
^3 8 8 1.17 Andhra Pradesh 301 70 70 1.04
12 - - - - Assam 105 4 - 4 0.45
53 13 11 2.3^ Bihar 318 75 3 61 2.77
22 5 5 1.44 Gujarat 154 26 23 17.47
18 4 4 0.68 Kerala 126 3 3 0.06
36 28 3 13 17.87 Madhya Pradesh 288 195 41 91 16.66
iH 1 1 .04 Madras 206 4 4 0.08
44 17 13 4,40 Maharashtra 264 127 100 5.00
26 7 6 2.68 Mysore 208 63 56 2.29
20 - - - - Orissa 140 - - - -
22 17 3 10 15. 18 Punjab 154 80 8 47 9.72
22 11 1 4 9.28 Rajasthan 176 94 15 55 9.17
86 74 7 33 17.51 Uttar Pradesh 430 377 49 192 16.46
36 4 4 1.05 West Eengal
Union Territories
252 25 24 0.45
5 5 82.66 Delhi _ _ w _ _
4 2 2 4.49 Himachal Pradesh - - - - -
2 - - - - Manipur - - - - -
2 — - - - Tripura - - — — —
494 196 14 114 6.44 TOTAL 3122 1143 116 730 6.07
(Total includes Kerala mid-term assembly election of i960)
Sources: Election Commission of India, Report on the Third General Election s
in India, 1962 , Vol. II, New Delhi, n.d.
Seminar 94, June I967.
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been won before and the percentage of votes received was more than 15/j ; in
the assembly, the number of seats dropped from nine to eight while the per-
centage of votes rose but moderately from 8.6$ to 9»7$« The division of the
Punjab into Punjab and Hariana, with some areas becoming part of Hir.-achal
Pradesh and Chandigarh city becoming a Union Territory, will necessarily have
an impact on the politics of the former states and its successor states and
will be felt within the Jana Sangh. The party was badly split after the
division, and was brought together by the personal efforts of Balraj Madhok.
In Delhi, the Jana Sangh sharply increased its share of the Lok Sabha
vote from 1/5 to 1/3 and lost the only seat it had before the election.
There is no assembly in Delhi, but elections to the Delhi municipal corpora-
tion were held simultaneously with the Lok Sabha polling. Here too, the Jana
Sangh increased its share of the vote from 26.36$ in 1958 to 30*97$ and saw
the number of seats held drop from 25 to 8. While the results in terms of
seats won were more than disappointing to the Jana Sangh, the extension of
support for the party to new levels and in all areas of the Union Territory
were taken as a source of encouragement.
In Bihar, the Jana Sangh had shown almost no progress at all between
the 1952 and 1957 elections. The RSS base was relatively weak, in comparison
with other states of the Hindi-speaking areas. Much of the southern part of
the state is populated by tribals, many of them Christians, with whom the
Jana Sangh was unable to make much headway. The hopes of merger with the
Janata Party were dashed, because it merged with Swatantra soon after the lat-
ter was launched. The gains of the Jana Sangh were modest. The party won
three seats in the assembly; of ^^ seats contested, 6l candidates lost their
deposits. The percentage of the vote received by the Jana Sangh more than
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doubled, but it uas still a tiny 2.7?,'o. The party also contested 13 of the
53 Lok Sabha seats, lost 10 deposits and polled 2. 3^ of the vote. VJhile the
record was not outstanding it was a beginning.
In 195? » the Jana Sangh won two Lok Sabha seats and four assembly
seats in Maharashtra. In 19&2, the party increased its share of the vote
2 l/2 times and won no seats either in the assembly or in parliament. The
increase in vote is illusory for it was attained only by increasing the num-
ber of candidates from 18 to 12? for the assembly and 100 of them lost their
deposits. The situation is not difficult to explain. The seats in 1957 had
been won on the strength of Jana Sangh participation in the Sarcyukta Maha-
rashtra Samiti. The Jana Sangh withdrew early from the Samiti and in any
case, the raison d'etre of th9 Samiti disappeared when the object of the
alliance, a separate Maharashtra state, was attained on April I, i960. Hav-
ing conceded a popular demand, the Congress both brought increased popularity
to itself and fragmented the opposition alliance. The Congress which in 1957
had barely won a majority of the seats in the areas that were to become Maha-
rashtra swept all before it in 19&2 and achieved in Maharashtra the largest
victory in India for the ruling party. The Jana Sangh was simply swept aside.
The party also continued to pay the penalty in Maharashtra for a large
Brahman membership and for its association with the RSS— "the murders of
Gandhi" slogan was still a millstone around Jana Sangh necks.
In the South Indian states the Jana Sangh has not been very successful.
In the state of Tamilnadu (Madras) the Jana Sangh tends to be identified with
a Hindu chauvinism and North India Brahmans. The DMK also enjoys vast finan-
cial support from the film industry and has leaders with great oratorical
skill in Tamil. The Jana Sangh lacks the resources, leadership and mass media
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communication in the state. -5" Another factor acting against the Jana Sangh
in Madras was the emergence of the Swatantra Party and its venerated leader
"Rajaji", who enjoys a very respected place in Madras politics.
In Andhra Pradesh, the Congress is very strongly entrenched and has
been able to absorb the Socialist party and defectors from the Congress party
who have returned to its folds and hence there seems to be no room for the
Jana Sangh in Andhra politics. 5< In Kerala, the Jana Sangh made bold to
enter the election contest only in 19^2, by contesting 4 parliamentary seats,
and 3 legislative assembly seats in the mid-term poll. But the party was
totally unsuccessful. The failure of the Jana Sangh is a very interesting
phenomenon in the state. Since the Communist Party is powerful in the state,
the Tightest elements looked for a strong party to represent their interests,
and the Congress party has been able to fulfill this need. And hence, the
chances for the Jana Sangh being established in the state are not very
great. -"-5° In Mysore state, caste works against Jana Sangh expansion. Though
the trading and peasant castes are numerically larger than the Brahman, and
though the Jana Sangh has been able to appeal to trading castes in other
parts of India, in Mysore it has failed. to do so. The reason being that the
Jana Sangh has been identified with the numerically small Brahmans; and there
is enmity between the Brahmans and other castes, so the latter do not support
the Jana Sangh. ->'
Appraisal
The party was generally pleased with the results, and commentators and
the press were by and large impressed. Upadhaya noted that the "party decided
to set up candidates in as many areas as was organisationally possible,.." 1 °
The Jana Sangh had shown "marked progress in numbers, but was still far behind
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the strength necessary for the fulfillment of the historic task assigned to
it. "161 The Punjab and Maharashtra units expressed the feeling that had they
concentrated on fewer seats they might have done better. The official party
line was that as many candidates as possible should be exposed in the belief
that this would pay off in the long run, even if it was conducive to a set
back in the short run.
The Indian press commented on the increase in Jana Sangh votes and
representation. The Times of India said:
Their hard organizational work paid dividends, but their success
surely is primarily due to the fact that they voice the political
aspirations of a large section of the electorate which is becoming
increasingly critical of the economic policies of the Congress...
The vote received by these two parties must... be regarded princi-
pally as a vote against the Congress Party's socialism. -^2
The Hindu also linked the increase in Jana Sangh votes with the emer-
gence of the Swatantra:
If any clear outline is to be traced in this contradictory, and
confusing, shift of electoral opinion in the various states, it must
be sought primarily in a developing contest between pragmatic social-
ism of the Congress.
. .and the extremism of the Communists , on the one
side and, on the other, the progressive liberalism of the Swatantra
and Jana Sangh parties, with their emphasis on limits to the State's
incursions in the economic field and greater realism in planning. ^
It is significant that both the Times of India and the Hindu omitted a charge
of coramunalism and the latter coupled the Jana Sangh with the Swatantra Party
as progressive and liberal.
The Communist Party journal New A^o also reacted to the increase of
the vote for the "Right", though with shock and concern:
What should really shock all Congressmen is the grim fact that in
eight states of the Union, their leadership has adopted such a
course that the reactionary Right has acquired the status of the
main opposition and in the nation's Parliament their representation
has increased more than ever before.
10!*
The Eastern Economist remarked:
It is the Jana Sangh again that promised, because of its militant
and disciplined character, a far greater opposition to the Congress
in the years to come. One might or might not like this particular-
expression of opinion of the Hindi electorate but it is undoubtedly
a forco of great importance which needs quickly to be evaluated. ->
Moreover, it would seem that the possibility of a long-range decline
in the strength of the Congress Party in the Hindi-speaking "Prussia"16" of
India can become a reality. This can be seen from the electoral endorsement
of the party in these areas. But at the same time, it must be kept in mind
that the Jana Sangh is dominated by the northern areas too in the party
organization.
In Uttar Pradesh, it was seen that the Jana Sangh had increased its
rural vote, but in the Punjab, it still relied on the urban vote. The Hindu
parties opposed each other again in many contests, but the Jana Sangh suc-
ceeded to a greater extent than its rivals. To sum up, the effects of the
I962 election were:
First the Jana Sangh made no substantial headway outside the
Hindi-speaking area. All of its parliamentary and assembly seats
were won in the states of north India. Outside this area approxi-
mately 90^ of the Jana Sangh candidates lost their security deposits
when they failed to poll one-sixth of the vote in their constituen-
cies. Secondly, a study of the assembly constituencies in Uttar
Pradesh shows that the Jana Sangh increased its share of the votes
in rural areas, though both in rural and urban areas the share
increased. Many observers had considered the Jana Sangh a party of
the urban Middle-class Hindu. In Uttar Pradesh this seems to be
changing, although in Punjab the party remains confined to the cit-
ies and dependent upon the votes of the urbanized Hindu population
rather than the rural Sikhs. Thirdly, another theory held that the
Jana Sangh would poll best in areas where the number of Muslims was
substantial. A study of the districts in Uttar Pradesh shows that
there is no apparent correlation between the percentage of Muslims
and the percentage of votes received by the Jana Sangh. ^"7
The emergence of the Swatantra Party brought a rival to the Jana Sangh
in its role as a conservative party as distinct from the role it plays as a
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Hindu party. The parties contested mainly in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and
Gujarat. The future alliance of the parties was a question that was very
much in the minds of the observers of the Indian political scene.
The 1962 election brought a much stronger Jana Sangh prepared to play
the role of official opposition in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh and ready
to make its voice heard more frequently in the Lok Sabha.
Inter-election Period
During this period the Jana Sangh elected as its President Dr. Raghu-
vira, the well known China expert. In foreign policy the Jana Sangh stressed
the need for the party to work closely with the west in order to contain
China.
In the Spring of 19&2 elections were held to the Rajya Sabha and
Legislative Councils, The Jana Sangh elected one member each in Uttar
Pradesh and Hadhya Pradesh. In the Legislative Councils three seats were won
in Maharashtra and one more in Andhra Pradesh.
In the by-elections the Jana Sangh was not successful. During the
election campaign for four Lok Sabha seats Raghuvira was fatally injured in a
car accident. Again, tragedy had struck at the highest echelon of the Jana
Sangh and it was deprived of promising potential leadership.
In the Vijayawada session of 19&5 the Jana Sangh adopted a new policy
statement which prefixed a philosophical statement which attempted to relate
modern democracy to Hindu traditions. The object of the party was stated to
be Dharm rajya, "the nearest English equivalent of dharm rajya is rule of
law." The economic objective was stated to be sanctity of private property
with necessity of social control. The slogan of "one country, one people,
one culture, one nation" was repeated."-*-""
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The Jana Sangh used the 19&5 period when hostilities broke out between
India and Pakistan to propagate its nationalist and anti-Pakistani views. It
called for all out war against Pakistan in order to settle the issue finally.
The Jana Sangh was active in the Ban Cow Slaughter March that took place in
New Delhi.
In 1966 the Jana Sangh selected one of its best known leaders, Profes-
sor Balraj Madhok as President to lead the party into the I967 elections.
d . The Fourth General Election - I967
Sele ction j?f
_
Candidates and Organization of the Campaign
For Legislative Assembly elections, the Jana Sangh contested almost
all the seats in U.P. and Delhi. In Haryana the party contested hQ of 81
seats and JO out of 60 in Himachal Pradesh. In Bihar 265 candidates wsre set
up for 318 seats. In Maharashtra I65 of 270 seats were contested. In all
other states the number was less than 5®p* In Delhi 5^ candidates out of 56
were nominated for the Metropolitan Council and 96 out of 100 for the Delhi
Municipal Corporation. -"-"9 Having no branches in Manipur, Pondicherry,
Andamans and Laccdive islands, the party set up no candidates. In Tripura,
Assam, Tamilnadu, Kerala, Gujarat and Orissa candidates were selected in only
a few constituencies.
Out of 520 Lok Sabha seats, the Jana Sangh contested 24-9. All the
seats from U.P. , M.P. , Haryana, Punjab, Bihar and Himachal Pradesh were con-
tested except where independents were supported or adjustments were made with
other parties. In an interview with Madhok it was learned that the Jana
Sangh was expecting victories in U.P. , M.P.
,
Rajasthan and Haryana. 1?
The organization was geared up early but, in many instances the party
was late in choosing Lok Sabha candidates and many cases filed its nomination
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on the last date. This way many a good seat was lost.
In the Orai constituency of U.P. women campaigners were effective in
going and talking to women in their houses. '* There was an emphasis on drs
ing more people to the polls. 172 <phe symbol of the party was widely dis-
played. Widespread disenchantment with the Congress helped the Jana Sangh
campaign.
Tactics
Anti-Congress propaganda was used by all opposition parties to a con-
siderable extent. The economic situation was exploited by all parties as
being a tremendous failure of the Congress rule. With the Chinese invasion
in 19d2, and the war with Pakistan in 19&5 » national feeling could also be
exploited.
Election strategy was adopted by the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha at
Nagpur on November 3~6i 19^6. Even though the people were discontented with
the Congress, Deen Dayal Upadhayaya said,
...it is considered necessary and desirable that instead of bas-
ing our strategy on a negative approacn to the Congress we would
strive to present a positive programme and build an alternative. We
therefore decided to keep away from the joint fronts forged with all
sorts of combinations by other opposition parties. Instead we
decided to contest the elections on our own ticket and programme.
The Pratinidhi Sabha however permitted adjustments with national
democratic elements. '3
Such adjustments were made with the Swatantra Party in Gujarat, Orissa,
Rajasthan and Haryana. Attempts were made in Bihar and U.P. , but they failed.
The Swatantra leaders did not want to ally with the Jana Sangh for fear of
losing communist support in Madras and Andhra. The Organizer lays the blame
for some election losses e.g. Junagadh on Swatantra party indiscipline. '^
In M.P., an adjustment was made with the Rajmata of Gwalior. She had
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been a Congress party member before, but was now leading her own party the
Jana Congress. Four of her nominees were to contest on the Jana Sangh symbol.
"This Jana Sangh-Palace axis was simply a marriage of convenience ,"-'7
5
There was considerable debate in the Jana Sangh Pratinidhi Sabha about
the party participating in post election coalition governments. The General
Council did approve of such a move, but there were arguments on both sides of
the question. The strongest arguments put forth in favour of joining coali-
tions were that the people's choice ought to be respected and if they had
given no clear mandate to one party, coalition government would be the result.
When members were aghast about working with the Communists, a reasonable
counter- comment was that the ministry could be better controlled by partici-
pating inside it. 176
Results 19671?7
The results of the elections were widely acclaimed by all opposition
parties. Congress had maintained its majority at the Center, but lost its
majority in half the states in the Union.
For the Jana Sangh, the results showed a general upward trend in all
the states and for Lok Sabha seats too. In the Lok Sabha, the Jana Sangh won
a total of 35 seats; compared to 14 in the I962 elections. They were won in
the same states as in I962 - M.P.
,
Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and U.P. with
one seat from Bihar. The popular vote polled for the Jana Sangh in the Lok
Sabha seats rose from 6.4*-$ to 9.3?/o.
In the contest for the Legislative Assembly seats, the Jana Sangh was
successful in the North Indian "Hindi" states, and made small headway in some
other states as well. In U.P. the Jana Sangh was returned as the official
opposition party with 97 seats out of an Assembly of 425 and was soon to
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TABLE VII
JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - I967
Lok Sabha State Legislative Asse mblies
Seats Cont. Won LD i
State
Seats Cont. Won' $
41 6 _ 5 1.44 Andhra Pradesh 287 80 3 2.26
14 3 - 2 5.59 Assam 126 20 1.86
53 43 1 32 1.14 Bihar 318 267 27 IO.69
24 - - - - Gujarat 168 17 1 2.C6
9 7 1 2 19.94 Haryana 81 47 12 1.35
19 4 - 4 1.39 Kerala 133 94 - .9
37 32 10 4 29.50 Madhya Pradesh 296 265 77 28.28
39 4 - 4 0.22 Madras 234 24 7 .14
45 24 - 19 7.00 Maharashtra 270 165 4 8.34
27 3 - 2 2.10 Mysore 216 39 4 2.71
20 2 - 2 0.64 Orissa 140 19 - .54
13 8 1 3 12.56 Punjab 104 49 9 9.36
23 6 3 1 9.71 Rajasthan 184 63 22 11.61
85 77 12 24 21.98 Uttar Pradesh 425 400 97 21.53
40 7 5 1.39 West Bengal
Union Territories
280 58 1 0.9
1 1 1 — _ Chandigarh _ _ _ mt
7 7 6 - 46.60 Delhi - - - -
6 3 - - 28.00 Himachal Pradesh 60 33 7 -
2 - - - - Manipur 30 - - -
2 - - - - Tripura 30 5 - -
1 - - - - Pondicherry no e!Lection
- - - - - Goa Daman & Diu 30 - - -
509 243 35 94 9.37 TOTAL 3477 1575 267 8.74
Figures ar9 not yet available for number of deposits lost in Assembly
Elections.
Sources: R. Chandidas, Leon Clark, Richard Fontera, Ward Morehouse (eds.)
India Votes: A Source Book on Indian Elections, (New York, 1968)
.
Seminar 94, June I967.
Indian Express
,
Feb. 23, 1967.
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participate in the United Front Ministry which followed when the Congress
ministry fell on April 3i 19^7 •' A phenomenal success for the party was
the capture of Kanpur city. In U.P. the party had nominated a number of Mus-
lims too.
In Bihar the party won 26 seats and had members in the Bihar state
Cabinet. This was a considerable achievement because in 1962, it had claimed
only 3 seats, and none in 1957. In the United Front Ministry there were Jana
Sangh members in the state cabinet. Soon there would be Jana Sanghis in the
M.P. cabinet, and in the Punjab too, after the mid-term poll in February
1969. 179
In Rajasthan the party did not fare as well as was expected though it
polled seven seats more than in I962. This was partly due to the presence of
the Swatantra and its support by the Jaipur Royal family.
In Delhi, the Jana Sangh won spectacular success. It won by 7 Lok
Sabha seats; 33 of the $6 Metropolitan Council and 52 of the 100 Municipal
Corporation. The Jana Sangh became the ruling party in the capital. Its
success there is attributed to 2 important factors: its cadre of RSS workers
and the people's disenchantment with Congress rule, and the exploitation by
Jana Sangh propaganda of this disillusionment. Of those on the Metropolitan
Council, one was a Muslim - Anwar Ali Delhvi.
Besides its success in the Hindi speaking areas, the Jana Sangh won
seats in some other non Hindi states as well—three in Andhra, one in Gujarat,
four in Maharashtra, three in Mysore and one in Vest Bengal.
Appraisal
The election results were a jolt to the Congress Farty; the electorate
had rejected the party, but its choice of another one party was not clear,
Ill
mainly because there is no one all-India party of the calibre of the Congress.
Coalition governments had come into power in Punjab, Bihar, West Bengal,
Orissa and Kerala. The stability of these coalitions was very much in doubt
and it was expected that there would be considerable efforts to cause defec-
tions and topple ministries. The Jana Sangh participated in coalitions in
Bihar, U.P. and Punjab, In Haryana it was decided to support the government,
not to accept any Cabinet positions. In Ii'.P, the Jana Sangh would soon parti-
cipate in the coalition government that was formed after the Congress minis-
try fell in July. The situation was extremely fluid and mid-term polls were
predicted for many states.
The election results were a success for the Jana Sangh, and showed the
right wing trend of the electorate. The party had improved its position in
all the states and Union territories where it participated in the election.
The results also showed a broadening base of Jana Sangh support by the seats
outside the Hindi heartland. Leaders were beginning to speak of modified
policies. Yet the RSS base of the party was strong. It is still too early
to discern with finality the trends that will emerge out of a fluid situation,
but the developments will be interesting. "As the Indian political experi-
ment enters a new phase portents of trouble ahead and signs of an increas-
ingly effective participatory democracy appear in kaleidoscopic confusion
giving an atmosphere of confusion and excitement to the changing Indian
scene. "180
Since the Elections of 19&7
Since the I967 elections there have been numerous changes on the
Indian political scene. In fact it becomes difficult at times to keep track
of the changing face of the state governments. Defections in party ranks
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Fig 2. Percentage of votes obtained by the Jana Sangh in five state Legislative
Assemblies in the four General Elections.
For the 1967 Election Results, the State of Punjab is considered in its
form before the present division into Punjab and Haryana.
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have been coramon. There were anti-Congress coalitions in the rlaryana, Punjab,
Bihar, U.P. and H.P. Soon there was President's rule in Rajasthan, Karyana,
and West Bengal. In the Punjab the Congress faced a crisis and the M.P.
ministry has not been stable. Bihar had a United Front rule, which replaced
the Soshit Dal. In all, the situation was in a state of flux. The Congress
tried to manipulate the fall of the non-Congress ministries and there have
been many "aayee rams" and "gayee rams"!"- -^ ^he government. In February
I969, mid-term elections were conducted in the states of Bihar, Punjab, U.P.,
West Bengal, and Ilagaland. The Congress has come to power in Bihar and U.P.
In West Bengal the Communist Party won an overwhelming victory, while in
Nagaland, the Naga National Organization came to power. In the Punjab, the
Akali Dal with the Jana Sangh has formed the government.
Since its success in the I967 Elections, the Jana Sangh has been try-
ing to project an all India image. 1°^ ^he question of a national language
has been the one uppermost in the minds of the politicians. Balraj Madhok
had recently expressed a modified stand, and the late President Deen Dayal
Upadhaya accepted any modern Indian language, but not English as a medium of
instruction. The party was also relaxing its policy on the state trading of
food grains, where before it had opposed all such moves. *
The discussion of the action of coalition governments had led to fur-
ther filtering of opinions in the Jana Sangh among those who see a difference
between the Right and Left Communists. One cannot practice "political
untouchability"1^ it was said. Stands of political reality are as such
being accepted by the Jana Sangh and this may seem to match the trend of
loosening the RSS control over the party. This trend was visible when Deen
Dayal Upadhaya was elected President of the Jana Sangh against the RSS
candidate Professor Mahavir. °5 Upadhaya stood for more alliances and broad-
ening the party base in M.P. and U.P.
Unfortunately, Upadhaya was found dead in a train compartment in
February 19o3.1°6 a high level judicial enquiry was set up to determine the
cause of his death, bo cause the circumstances did look suspicious. He has
been succeeded by Atal Eehari Vajpayee who ranks among the younger leaders of
the Jana Sangh and is in the flexible wing of the party. In fact, his stand
at the National Integration Council has been quite secular, but RSS Chief
Golwalkar called it a bluff to win Muslim votes. 1°7 The RSS is also striking
at the points where the non-RSS people had a stronghold—in the legislative
sphere of the Jana Sangh development. The RSS cadres are efficient workers,
highly disciplined and toe the party line with extremely few dissensions.
Hence they make effective campaign workers. The Jana Sangh is dependent upon
their support for success in elections. Yet, it would seem that the develop-
ment of the party on broader lines will definitely be hampered if its organi-
zation and policy is RSS-controlled.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In this study we have observed various facets of the Jana Sangh, in
particular the direction in which the party is evolving and the part it will
play in the future Indian political system.
From the support that the Jana Sangh obtains in its electoral victo-
ries in Northern India and the leadership that the area provides for the
party it is evident that the North is the bastion of support for the Jana
Sangh. Moreover the Jana Sangh as a protagonist for the maintenance of Hindi
as the national language obtains a vast following in these predominantly
Hindi states. At present it seems that the language issue is the main source
of attraction for Jana Sangh support in the North. And, in order to retain
this support, the party continually advocates the maintenance of Hindi as the
national language of India.
The language issue has become an important part of the regional chau-
vinism that is flourishing in India and, in the South, this espousal of the
maintenance of Hindi as the national language restricts the appeal of the
Jana Sangh. Evidence of this restricted appeal can be observed in the Elec-
tion results, and leadership positions within the party. Of twelve Presidents
only one has been a South Indian and the General Secretary of the party who is
considered more powerful than the President has always been a North Indian.
Besides, there are other strong parties like the DMK and Communists in the
South, and they limit the scope of the expansion of the Jana Sangh south of
Maharashtra. Even the Swatantra with whom the Jana Sangh has allied itself
in some northern states does not favour similar alliances in the southern
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states of India, like Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu, because such alliances
would jeopardize Swatantra's relationship with other parties of the South and
endanger its position. The attempts at a permanent Jana Sangh-Swatantra
alliance have been inconclusive. Even the slight gains that the Jana Sangh
made in the South in the Fourth General Election can be accounted for by the
general anti-Congress attitude that prevailed in the political mood of the
country and the Jana Sangh was able to take advantage of it. Therefore it
seems that Jana Sangh influence will be limited to the Northern states. Hence
the aspirations of the party for assuming all-India status and commanding a
majority in the National Parliament seem limited in the near future. Eut in
the north, the prospects for the future expansion of the party are bright.
It seems that its strength will lie mainly in U.P., M.P. , Delhi, Rajasthan,
Haryana, Punjab and Eihar. But whether the Jana Sangh will be the sole
majority party in a state is again doubtful. It has and will come to power
within coalition governments. But to participate in coalition governments,
the party can ill afford to be doctrinaire. Flexibility185 in contracting
alliances and participating in coalitions will be virtually necessary. The
Jana Sangh has exhibited such pragmatism in the past. The Jana Sangh and
Swatantra differ on many issues - language policy, foreign affairs, and eco-
nomic policy; yet in 19&7 the two parties concluded alliances in Gujarat,
Orissa and Rajasthan. The most recent and startling example has been the
Jana Sangh-Akali Dal success in the Funjab in the mid-term poll of February
I969 and both parties are now represented in the state cabinet. The two
parties had opposed each other bitterly on the formation of a separate state
for the Sikh minority in the former state of the Punjab. This was a Hindu v.
Sikh confrontation and the Jana Sangh had advocated a Maha-Punjab that would
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include the present Punjab, Haryana, PSPSU and Delhi. But, once the Punjabi
Suba was conceded by the Central Government in 19&7 , Jana Sangh leaders espe-
cially Balraj Madhok worked hard to create a viable Jana Sangh party in the
new Punjab. Their foresight has paid dividends and the party is now in a
governing position in the state. Where once the Jana Sangh had shunned even
an electoral alliance with the Akali Dal, today it is in partnership with it
in the control of a state.
This participation by the Jana Sangh should affect its outlook with
beneficial effect. When far removed from power, parties tend to take unreal-
istic stands in policy. But, once they are faced with responsibility these
demands may be modified. Utopian goals like full employment and a house for
every family with a plea for independent nuclear capability will have to be
modified.
Pragmatism in another sphere is also important for the Jana Sangh.
This is to fight the lable of "communalism" that is often applied to the
party. The Jana Sangh a by-product so to speak of the RSS and the Kahasabha
is the least communal of the three organizations. Both the RSS and Mahasabha
have restricted membership regulations, but while the former opposes even
social reform, the latter advocates liberal reform in terms of the removal
of: caste distinctions, untouchability , restricted caste dining and temple
entry. The Jana Sangh on the other hand has an open membership, and claims
that its emphasis is en a "Bharatiya" rather than a "Hindu" rashtra. It has
accepted Muslims and Christians in its membership. Some people regard these
features skeptically, yet the difference in emphasis cannot be absolutely
disregarded. It can also be argued that certain slogans are used because
they have a greater appeal to the mass of an electorate that is largely
US
illiterate. It must also be remembered that there are other parties that are
communal too: the Akali Dal, Muslim League, DMK. Somehow they are less
vociferously attacked by the Congress Party than the Jana Sangh, This may bo
because the Jana Sangh as the representative of the Hindu majority is seen as
a greater threat in exacerbating social tensions. But the Jana Sangh must
guard against too liberal a use of such slogans. The refusal of the party to
support birth control measures, or the use of chemical fertilizer will lay it
open to a charge of being communal. The positive advocacy of such measures
is vital for the development and progress of a modern India.
A considerable measure of the open mindedness of the Jana Sangh will
depend upon the leadership of the party. Th9 two most widely known members
who represent the flexible wing of the party are Prof. Balraj Madh.ok and Atal
Behari Vajapayee. The RSS has been the organizational bulwark of the Jana
Sangh. Its cadre of Swayamsevaks who join the Jana Sangh are efficient work-
ers, trained to obey orders implicitly and hence factionalism, the bane of
other Indian political parties, very rarely appears in the Jana Sangh ranks.
Until very recently the RSS had not perceived the Parliamentary group in the
Jana Sangh with its more flexible attitude, as being a threat to its (RSS)
hold of the party. But the increasing electoral success of the Jana Sangh
seems to have made the RSS cautious. From recent press reports it seems that
the organisational supporter of the Jana Sangh wants to control policy too.
Kadhok was replaced as the leader of the Parliamentary party by a RSS nomi-
T fio
nee.-1- - Hadhok did not deliver his usual pro-U.S. foreign policy speech at
the National Council in Indore.^0 jn fact the Russian invasion of Czecho-
slavakia was not condemned on the ground that it did not affect India. This
is sparse evidence and may not be a permanent trend. However, it would not
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be wrong to conclude that while moderation and flexibility-1-^-'- have brought
electoral success to the Jana Sangh this very stance of moderation is threat-
ened by the doctrinaire R3S wing of the party which may be riding high on a
rising feeling of comnrunalism in the country.
Thus from the present trend of development it becomes evident that
moderation in leadership has enabled the Jana Sangh to profit in terms of
gaining political power. Continued flexibility and reduced RSS control may
enable the Jana Sangh to become a stronger participant in coalitions and an
effective opposition party at least at the state level on the Indian political
scene.
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The purpose of this study is an investigation of the development of
the Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party and an attempt to calculate the future posi-
tion of the party in the changing Indian political system. At present, the
position of opposition parties is assuming greater importance in India due
to the declining fortunes of the dominant Congress party, a fact which is
evident after the fourth General Elections in 19^7 . The Jana Sangh has
obtained an increased share of the popular vote and seats in the National
Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies in each successive election. The
rise of the Jana Sangh, a "communal" party is often perceived as a threat to
India's secular democracy, but observation of the party indicates that parti-
cipation in the electoral process tends to modify and moderate the communal
character of the party.
In order to calculate the future trends of the party, the origins of
the party, its organizational attributes, ideology and electoral performance
are studied.
The historical foundations of the Jana Sangh lie in Hindu communal
organizations, but the Jana Sangh has been more successful at the polls than
other Hindu parties, partly due to less doctrinaire behavior. Further expan-
sion of the party's influence seems to require that this flexibility be main-
tained. The functioning of the organizational apparatus of the Jana Sangh
ensures stability and continuity of the party, and indicates that the Jana
Sangh derives its support and leadership from the North Indian states. The
study of party ideology reveals a slight change in domestic policy from
socio-cultural to economic issues and this is interpreted as a maturing of
the party. It is also evident that the popular appeal of the party is great-
est in areas of North Indian urban dislocation, and to maintain this folio-ring
a hard line on certain foreign policy issues is maintained. It is also clear-
that the emphatic support of Hindi as the national language in a large meas-
ure alienates support for the party in the south Indian States. Tho electoral
performance of the party portrays tho increasing support the Jana Sangh has
received at the polls. For the present it is evident that aspirations of
becoming the party in power at the Center must be postponed, but the Jana
Sangh* s hopes of achieving power at the State level are justified by its per-
formance. Yet, it is likely that the Jana Sangh will come to power in the
States, as it already has in some, in coalition with other political parties.
To participate in such coalitions flexibility is necessary, and such flexi-
bility is likely to continue to modify the party's communal character. It is
in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Bihar
that the party will play its most significant role.
